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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the region in its role as a regional security 
provider through a within-case study of West Africa. The point of departure is on 
one hand that contemporary threats to international peace and security are 
increasingly regional, arising within states rather than from a global or out-of-
region origin, and on the other hand that the regions among the world has become 
salient security providers. The theoretical and epistemological basis rests on social 
constructivist concepts and theories on the evolution of the West African Regional 
Security Complex. I have found that the processes of securitisation and 
desecuritisation among the states in West Africa are so interlinked that their 
security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one 
another. The security interdependence between the states has been highly 
dependent on de jure changes in distribution of power, shifts in the pattern of 
amity and enmity, and alternations in penetration of external actors. Three 
characteristics have continued to hamper the evolution of the security complex: (i) 
the weak state capacity of its members resulting in a gap between agreed norms 
and rules of conduct, and institutional capacity and resources; (ii) the principles of 
state sovereignty and search for consensus in regional decision-making blocking 
collective conflict prevention and management; (iii) the phenomenon of 
presidentialism and prevailing pattern of executive dominance in member states 
and its repercussions on regional decision-making.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The point of departure for this thesis is that regions among the world have become 
increasingly salient actors in the space between the domestic and global levels in 
international relations. In the introductory chapter I present the identified 
scientific problem, and the purpose and research question of the thesis. Further on, 
I introduce the theoretical and methodological approach of the study, its context 
and outline. 
 
 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
   
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the region in its role as a regional security 
provider through a within-case study of West Africa. In my study West Africa is 
defined as the territory comprised of the following fifteen states: Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. In studies of 
international relations (IR) the traditional ontological point of departure have been 
a focus on two levels of analysis; the state and the international system (Waltz 
2001). However, latest decades has experienced a rise of sub-systems, in 
particular, regional organisations as a level of analysis (Buzan 2009). Scholars 
argue that contemporary security threats are increasingly regional, arising within 
states rather than from a global or out-of-region origin. Thus, imposing an 
emphasis on regional solutions based on regional co-operation (Buzan&Weaver 
2003; Bellamy 2004). The case for developing regional mechanisms in Africa is 
often captured in the phrase ´African solutions to African problems`, intended to 
mobilize Africans to solve their problems (Ayangafac&Cilliers 2011:116). 
The scientific problem that I have identified is not the growing regionalization, 
per se, rather the delimitation of the region as an autonomous ontological entity 
from on one hand the state and on the other hand the global level. Some argue that 
it is a distinct level (Buzan&Waever 2003), others that the levels, in particular, the 
regional and international levels conflate (Lake&Morgan 1997). In short, what is 
at the center of my paper is whether the region is a security actor that 
ontologically could be defined as an autonomous level of analysis or if it is an 
institution through which states on the regional level as well as the global level 
have decided to act. 
My research question is: What are the mechanisms behind the region as a 
security provider in the case of West Africa? My argument is that regional co-
operation matters when it comes to securitisation and desecuritisation, however, 
the processes are dependent on the interests of regional hegemons and global 
actors. From a critical perspective the proposition raises two questions; (i) how 
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can regional co-operation be a tool for regional hegemons? (ii) how can regional 
security mechanisms be dependent on global actors? The answer on these two 
later questions would address the initial problem of my research; whether the 
regional level ontologically could be considered as an autonomous level of 
analysis or a part of on one side the state level or the global level on the other. 
The concept of security could be understood as the pursuit of freedom from 
threat (Buzan 2009:37). Traditionally security has been linked to territoriality and 
the political or military sectors. Thus, in the context of the international system, 
security has been about the ability of states and societies to maintain their 
independent identity and their functional identity. However, contemporary 
security studies have found it necessary to include other sectors working with 
societal security, i.e. the economic, societal and environmental sectors 
(Buzan&Waever 2003:70). The question is whether these sectors should fall 
under the rubric of security or relate to it only through their impact on the threat 
and use of force (Lake&Morgan 1997:21). An emphasis on physical safety that is 
the focus of this thesis narrows considerably the threats and the key resources 
needed to cope with them. Further on, the fact that states continue to operate as if 
physical safety is the core element of security also influence what is at the center 
of the concept, mainly military-political resources (cp. Lake&Morgan 1997:22). 
This is not to say that there sometimes is a need to broaden the definition of what 
needs to be included in the concept of security, e.g. new types of security threats 
such as organized criminality, drug and human trafficking, illicit exploitation of 
natural resources, and terrorism (OECD 2012; UN 2012a; Aning 2011:149). From 
the discussion follows that I understand a security provider as an actor with ability 
to successfully reduce/remove a specific threat against a specific object. 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
 
The theoretical approach of the thesis follows a worldview that broadly could be 
linked to the traditions of the English School. Thus, my approach is characterized 
of a pragmatic position to the influence of international institutions between on 
one hand realism and liberalism, and on the other hand social constructivism 
(Hurrell 2009:12). Following the English School I accept the realist position that 
the international system is anarchic and the sovereignty of states. However, 
attracted by the idea of social constructivism I find it possible to establish 
common norms and rules of conduct within that system. 
My theoretical framework departs from the Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT) developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003) and the concept of 
Security Communities (Bellamy 2004). A RSC is defined as ´a set of units whose 
major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that 
their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one 
another` (Buzan&Waever 2003:44). Security Communities could be understood 
as communities whose members renounce the use of force in their relations with 
one another in accordance with a heightened sense of ´we-feeling` (Bellamy 
2004:14). In order to qualify as an RSC the members must possess a certain 
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degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set 
and to differentiate them from the surrounding regions (Buzan&Waever 2003:47). 
My hypothesis is that the degree of security interdependence that decides on 
the evolution of the RSC is dependent on, firstly the polarity or distribution of 
power within the RSC, secondly the social construction or pattern of amity and 
enmity between the members of the RSC, and thirdly the penetration of external 
actors or ´outside` actors inside the RSC. These variables can in turn be analysed 
in terms of ideational structures (e.g. identities, interests and norms) and material 
aspects (e.g. institutions, political/military interaction). Following my 
methodological approach of constructivism, ideational factors have causal priority 
over material factors. Ideational structures are therefore a necessary condition for 
the outcome of the dependent variable. Material structures are independent 
variables that are contributing causes, though neither necessary nor sufficient, 
however important for the degree of security interdependence. 
 
 
1.3 Context and Outline 
 
Regional cooperation in West Africa started out as a collective quest for self-
reliance and economic development with the establishment of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (ECOWAS 2012a). The current 
security framework, ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) makes 
West Africa in many aspects the forerunner in advanced mechanisms for 
addressing regional peace and security in Africa (ECOWAS 2012b; Obi 
2009:120). The African Union (AU) mimics ECOWAS in many aspects 
(Utas&Jörgel 2007:31). As one of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
that constitute the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) ECOWAS 
had taken decisions before the birth of the AU on Peace Support Operations 
(PSO) in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire and to establish 
essential components on the regional level which has come to characterize the 
APSA on the continental level (Elowson&MacDermott 2010:27). In this thesis I 
will show how ECOWAS has developed an extensive normative and institutional 
framework for conflict prevention and management; however, also that its 
capacity to move from rhetoric to practice has been dependent on its regional 
hegemon Nigeria and external actors. 
The thesis is organized in the following way. Next chapter discusses the 
theoretical framework that provides the basis for my analysis of the West African 
RSC. It examines theories and concepts on international order, regional security 
and the state in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 3 considers methodological aspects, 
such as the implications of philosophy of science, the research method and case 
selection, and data collection and sources. In Chapter 4 I analyse the evolution of 
the West African RSC. The analysis includes two dimensions: the development of 
norms and rules of conduct, and how these have been materialized in the 
establishment of institutions and collective action. The thesis finishes with my 
conclusions from the study. 
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2. Theories and Concepts 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of the following chapter is to provide the theoretical basis for my 
thesis. It embraces three questions: (i) how can we understand different aspects of 
international order; (ii) how can we understand the concept of regional order; (iii) 
how can we understand the contemporary state in Sub-Saharan African (hereafter 
Africa). Following the English School and its eclectic traditions my theoretical 
approach is characterized of a pragmatic position ´attracted by elements of realism 
and idealism`, gravitated towards the middle ground (Linklater 2005:85). This is 
not to say that ´everything works` rather to show that it is necessary to move 
beyond the divide between empirical analysis on the one side and a purely 
normative approach on the other (cp. Hurrell 2009:13). The chapter is organized 
in three sections that in proper order discuss dynamics of international order, 
theories on regional security and features of the contemporary African state. 
 
 
2.1 On International Order 
 
Theories on international order have traditionally been influenced by the 
assumption that the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 contained the core principles of 
how international order is shaped (Hurrell 2009:54). The Westphalian order builds 
principally on the maintenance of balance of power between states in a uni-, bi- or 
multipolar system. The era of the Cold War could typically be characterized as a 
bipolar system. The features of the post-Cold War period have varied from a 
unipolar system that followed the collapse of the Sovjet Union, but transforming 
into a multipolar system with several global actors, however, dominated by one 
hegemon, the United States (US) (Buzan&Weaver 2003:54). The European 
Concert that evolved after the Napoleonic Wars illustrates typically a multipolar 
system where peace and security was built through equilibrium (Holsti 1991:114). 
The origin of the Westphalian system departs from Niccolò Machiavelli´s and 
Thomas Hobbes´s pessimistic view on human egoism and how that govern the 
behavior of human beings, ´the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and 
short`, and subsequently the behavior of states, ´a warre, as is of every man, 
against every man` (Hobbes 2006:70). However, the Westphalian system also 
includes agreed rules of conduct and an expectation that those rules will be 
observed. The Westphalian paradigm is therefore characterized of three features. 
The first is the assumption that the system is anarchic, meaning that there is no 
authority or hierarchy that can decide on conflicts between sovereign states. The 
second is that the state is the primary actor in the system, and the third, the 
assumption that states interest are to maximize national interests and their own 
security, raison d'état, relative other states (Dunne&Schmidt 2008:92). The ideas 
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of anarchy, sovereignty and non-intervention are deeply connected to mainstream 
theories focusing on ´the acts of individuals or the acts of states` that makes up the 
forces in international relations (Waltz 2001:232). From this position would 
follow that realists reject the influence of international institutions on international 
order that instead reflects the balance of power between states where institutions 
do not influence individual states behaviour (Mearsheimer 1995:13). Liberal ideas 
move beyond the realist perspective in recognizing the role of international 
institutions, however, departs from the same ontological position that states are 
the primary actors in the international system (Bauer 2006:25). 
For scholars of the English School it is important to move beyond the 
Westphalian system and realist assumptions about the unbridgeable gulf between 
domestic and international politics to understand contemporary changes, such as 
regionalization, in international order (Hurrell 2009:54). I will refer to this ´move 
beyond` as the ´constructivist turn` in international relations that has become 
influential on the development of theories on regional order, a matter to which I 
turn in the next section. As a general theory on how international order is 
produced constructivism departs from a view that order is socially constructed and 
the result of interaction and interdependence between states. Constructivists also 
recognize the importance of international institutions in the development of norms 
and rules of behaviour, and therefore, contrary to realists and liberalists view 
international institutions as autonomous actors in the international system 
(Barnett&Finnmore 1999:726; Bauer 2006:24). 
Members of the English School adhere to the ideas of an anarchic international 
system and the sovereignty of the state; however, they come to the conclusion that 
the international system is more civil and orderly than realists suggest (Linklater 
2005:85). Hedley Bull, one of the founding fathers of the English School, 
distinguished between an international system and an international society. The 
former, a Hobbesian security seeking one, could be understood as a system where 
two or more states have sufficient contact between one another, and have 
sufficient impact on one another´s decisions to cause them to behave as parts of a 
whole. The later, a Lockean progressive one, is a society of states that comes into 
being when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and values, 
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a set of 
common rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of 
common institutions (Linklater 2005:90). The focus on normative and institutional 
factors that gives the international society its own logic distinguish the English 
School from realism and illustrates the constructivist turn in international relations 
(Linklater 2005:92). Thus, emphasizing the process which transforms systems of 
states into societies of states and the construction of norms and institutions which 
makes up the political order (Linklater 2005:93). Barry Buzan, a later member of 
the English School, further developed the third tradition of the English School, i.e. 
the Kantian idea of a world society or cosmopolitanism envisaging a world order 
(Kant 1795; Buzan 2006:9). Together these three strands on one hand form a 
complete and interlinked picture of international relations, and on the other hand 
illustrate the English School of perspective and its theoretical pluralism. I turn 
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now to how these theories and concepts could be transferred to ideas on regional 
security. 
 
 
2.2 On Regional Security 
 
During the Cold War there was a tendency in IR to focus on the balance of power 
between the two super powers and thus a focus on the global level 
(Buzan&Weaver 2003:6). Therefore, regional order became more or less a 
reflection of the international system (Buzan&Weaver 2003:16). However, the 
post-Cold War has seen the rise of on one side a globalist perspective and a 
regionalist perspective on the other. The former departs from the replacement of 
the Westphalian order by deterritorialisation of world politics (Buzan&Weaver 
2003:31). The later, the regionalist perspective that I would argue is be relevant 
for this thesis, rests on two assumptions; (i) that the decline of superpower rivalry 
has reduced the penetration of global actors in the rest of the world and opened up 
for regional security dynamics begun with decolonization; (ii) that domestic 
dynamics have pulled great powers away from military engagement and strategic 
competition leaving local states and societies to sort out their military-political 
relationships with less interference from great powers (Buzan&Weaver 2003:10-
20). The increasingly focus on regions could, however, also be explained by three 
other factors: (i) new threats that arise within states are not contained within that 
state alone; (ii) increase in international interventions requires the international 
community to develop partnership with regional organizations; (iii) regional 
arrangements have become more proactive in addressing security threats than 
international organizations (Williams&Haacke 2011:49). 
The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) understands the regional level 
as a distinct ontological level of analysis located between the global and the local 
level, however, not automatically with actor quality (Buzan&Weaver 2003:27). 
Lake and Morgan in principle concur with Buzan and Weaver´s approach to the 
theory on regional security complexes. However, they divert in two important 
aspects that are relevant to this thesis. On one hand they narrow the concept of 
security within a complex as a matter of physical security, on the other hand their 
revised theory opens up for possible members of a complex not located in the 
neighbourhood (Lake&Morgan 1997:30-31). Thus, there is in their view not a 
clear distinction between members of the complex, and actors from the outside, 
instead outsiders could sometimes be regarded as inside the complex. 
International institutions should as well be assessed with the security order they 
operate (Lake&Morgan 1997:38). In short, their approach does not view the 
regional level as a distinct ontological level of analysis, rather as conflating with 
the global level. Although, the central element in a RSC is its security relations 
and the elements of interdependence between its members, Lake and Morgan 
come to the conclusion that great power solutions to regional conflicts will be 
likely to prove elusive for the foreseeable future (1997:66). Great powers and 
superpowers could be understood as global actors that operate at the system level, 
and regional powers as states operating at the regional level. What differs between 
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a great power and a superpower is that the later require broad-spectrum 
capabilities exercised across the whole spectrum of the international system, and 
the military-political and economic capacities to support such capabilities. The 
former has appropriate levels of capabilities, but not necessarily big capabilities in 
all sectors; however, they are recognised by other states on the basis of system 
level distribution of power. A regional power is a state that defines the polarity of 
a given RSC. From a regional perspective their capabilities are large, but on the 
global level they remain of less consequence or appropriateness (Buzan&Weaver 
2003:34-37). 
A RSC is defined as ´a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, 
desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot 
reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another` (Buzan&Waever 
2003:44). The RSCT represents the constructivist turn in international relations 
and builds on one hand on the pattern of amity and enmity among the units in the 
system, and on the other hand on the polarity or the distribution of power in that 
system (Buzan&Weaver 2003:49). The theory does not say that the regional level 
always is dominant, rather that it operates within a security constellation of levels; 
the state, the regional and the global level where the regional level may or may 
not be dominant, but nearly always plays a significant role and therefore cannot be 
left out of the analysis (Buzan&Weaver 2003:52).  Central to the theory is the 
idea that adjacency is important to security because ´threats travel more easily 
over short distances than over long ones`, thus, giving security dynamics a strong 
territoriality (Buzan&Waever 2003:45). Following the definition of a RSC the 
process of securitisation and desecuritisation is to what extent the members of the 
RSC are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed 
or resolved apart from one another. In order to qualify as an RSC the members 
must possess a certain degree of security interdependence sufficient both to 
establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from the surrounding 
security regions (Buzan&Waever 2003:47). 
The essential structure of a RSC is defined by four variables; (i) the boundary 
that differentiate it from its neighbours; (ii) the anarchic structure within the RSC 
(between two or more units); (iii) the polarity or the distribution of power among 
the units; (iv) the social construction or pattern of amity and enmity among the 
units. Variations in these variables would influence the evolution of a RSC, either 
through internal or external transformation, ranging from conflict transformation, 
through security regime to security community (Buzan&Weaver 2003:53-54). 
These evolutionary steps could broadly be related to the types of international 
order discussed in the previous section. The first, a Hobbesian anarchic system 
characterized of a pattern of security interdependence shaped by fear of war and 
rivalry. The second, a Lockean model shaped by fear of war and rivalry, but a 
regime where fears and expectations are restrained by agreed set of rules of 
conduct. The third, a Kantian model where states do not expect or prepare for the 
use of force in their relations with each other (Buzan&Weaver 2003:471). Among 
regions in the world, e.g. Europe could clearly by defined as a security 
community, while many others belong to the two first types pending on the 
yardstick by which they are measured. Implementing the definition of a RSC on 
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the African continent it is Southern Africa and West Africa that have come 
furthest in their evolution as a RSC, while the Central and East African regions do 
not yet qualify as a RSC. In short, the RSCT tells us that it is the polarity or 
distribution of power, and the pattern of amity and enmity among members within 
the complex that decides the characteristics of a given RSC. The theory treats 
RSCs as distinct ontological units between the local and the global level; 
however, it includes aspects of global actor´s penetration as a possible variable. I 
turn now to the concept of security communities. 
The concept of Security Communities, communities whose members renounce 
the use of force in their relations with one another in accordance with a 
heightened sense of ´we-feeling` was developed by Karl Deutsch (Linklater 
2005:106). Drawing on the writings of Deutsch et al. (1957) Alex J. Bellamy has 
further developed the concept of security communities and their role in 
contemporary IR (Bellamy 2004:14). His theoretical approach represents no 
exception from the tradition of the English School and the constructivist 
worldview that the international society is socially constructed. The constructivist 
turn would, thus, mean that normative and ideational structures are just as 
important as material structures (Bellamy 2004:17). Contrary to the neo-realist 
and neo-liberalist approach that states actions are based on the logic of 
consequence or rational behaviour, the process of socialization, social learning 
and norm construction, and the logic of appropriateness, thus, becomes important 
in his theoretical reasoning. The logic of appropriateness implies that actions 
cannot be separated from its social and normative context. Similar to the 
construction of communities, the perception of security in the international system 
is framed by notions of identities and interests (Bellamy 2004:17-27). Thus, logic 
of consequence and logic of appropriateness could be seen as ´the basic logic of 
action by which human behavior is interpreted` (March&Olsen 1998:949). 
However, political action cannot be explained exclusively in terms of logic of 
either consequences or appropriateness. Any particular action probably involves 
elements of each. Political actors are constituted both by their interests, by which 
they evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in their 
identities and political institutions. They calculate consequences and follow rules, 
and the relationship between the two is often subtle (March&Olsen 1998:952).  
Bellamy´s framework for analysis of security communities includes four areas. 
The first two areas investigate the ideational aspects of security communities; how 
they are constructed by assessing identities, interests and norms and then locating 
them in a broader regional and global context, and to what extent the identities, 
interests, norms of the community overlap with those of its neighbours (Bellamy 
2004:52-58). The second two areas focus on the materialization of the 
community; the degree of institutional, economic and social ties within the 
security community, and then the scope and quality of relations between insiders 
and outsiders (Bellamy 2004:58-62). Bellamy differentiates between communities 
that are more mature and tightly-coupled and those that are less mature and 
loosely-coupled. Situating security communities in a global perspective Bellamy 
argues that the more security communities there are and the more tightly-coupled 
they become the more blurred will the boundaries between insiders and outsiders 
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become. Thus, security communities may have a mitigating and even eliminating 
role on violent conflict between states irrespectively of on what type of 
governance they are founded (Bellamy 2004:187). I turn now to how theories and 
concepts on the African state could help analysing the domestic influence on 
regional security. 
 
 
2.3 On the African State 
 
In IR there has been a tendency to consider all states alike, following the ideal 
type of state that typically has its origin in European experiences. As discussed in 
the previous section the RSC cannot be analysed without taking into account the 
domestic level. The challenge here is that the Weberian state and Westphalian 
system has not taken root on the African continent (Williams 2007:5). Instead the 
African state could be interpreted as a hybrid copy of the ideal type of Weberian 
state (Reno 1998:18). This is not to say that it would be impossible to characterize 
the contemporary African state. Although there is a variation caused by different 
pre-colonial and colonial heritages, states in Africa bear some type of similarities 
and common features that are relevant in studies of IR (Hyden 2007:54). At the 
same time it is important to notice the diversity of the African continent and its 
domestic varieties. 
Most African state has during a relative short period in history gone through 
far-reaching and large-scale changes with external rather than internal origin. The 
two most significant could be linked to the processes of on one hand colonization 
followed by decolonization and on the other hand the Cold War followed by the 
post-cold War era. This is not to say that internal transformation has taken place. 
The circumstance that decolonization took place during the Cold War and the shift 
that followed after the end of the Cold War maid the African state particularly 
vulnerable for outside penetration (Reno 1998:45). The most significant features 
were; firstly, that the independent state inherited the colonial structure of a 
bifurcated state created by indirect rule and the practice of customary law 
(Mamdani 1996:287-288); secondly, international development assistance and 
programs has been built on conditionality and forced democratization through 
inter alia pre-mature elections (Duffield 2007:222); thirdly, the transformation of 
rivalry on the global level into conflicts on the African continent (Buzan&Weaver 
2003:250). In the following paragraphs I highlight two characteristics of the 
African state that have an influence on domestic politics, and in turn regional 
security. Firstly, the weak power of the state and how that has affected regional 
capacities. Secondly, the phenomenon of neo-patrimonialism and how it has 
effected state-formation. The point of departure is that most African states are not 
consolidated nation-states, rather still in the process of state-formation (Hyden 
2007:70). 
The discourse of weak and failed states or fragile states has become the focus 
on the security and development nexus in the African context (Patrick 2011:268). 
Fragile states could be described along a continuum of declining state capacity, as 
weak, failed and collapsed states (Rotberg 2003:4-9). States fail because they 
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cannot provide public goods, such as security, rule of law, basic social service or 
economic well-being, and legitimacy of government to their people (Herbst 
2000:259; Rotberg 2002:87; Williams 2007:2). One of the most central roles of 
the state is to provide security and order across the whole of its territory and not 
limited to a capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones (Boege et al. 
2009:15). Control over territory and borders is assured not only by physical 
means, such as military force or police authority, but also by developing state 
institutions and infrastructure to exercise more substantial control over the whole 
state. In weak or failed states, people instead tend to turn to traditional leaders and 
local warlords for security and basic needs (Herbst 2000:270). In short, the 
inability of the weak state to provide basic human needs can on one hand explain 
root causes of intra-state conflicts, and on the other hand help understand the 
transition to what William Reno (1998) labels ´warlord politics` on the African 
continent. I would argue that ´warlordism` did not come to an end with the civil 
wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire or Guinea Bissau, rather it can still be 
observed in recent instability in Mali, Niger, Nigeria and again in Côte d'Ivoire. 
Weak and failed states concentrate poverty and its effects, and have therefore 
come to be perceived as a great threat to global stability (Duffield 2007:167). One 
of the reasons is that they have been viewed as potential breeding ground for new 
transnational threats (Williams 2007:3). However, the connection is not clear-cut, 
much less universal (Patrick 2011:242). As most states falls along a continuum of 
state-capacity between the pools of ´good` and ´bad` governance it is a mistake to 
frame African states as a cohort, as a mortal threat to global security. Weak and 
failing states can, however, under certain conditions, contribute to transnational 
threats, but the connection between weak governance and global insecurity is less 
straightforward than often portrayed (Patrick 2011:243). 
Weak states can be characterized by the degree of institutionalization and 
capacities of state institutions, and their autonomy (Holsti 2004:84). Such a 
characterization needs to distinguish between the scope of state functions and the 
strength of institutions (Fukuyama 2005:9). Goran Hyden argues that the 
executive capacity of the state can be strong or weak and the legality or adherence 
to rules can be seen as firm or soft (2007:69). In his categorization of state types, 
the state in Africa is both weak and soft (Hyden 2007:229). James Ferguson 
argues that many states in contemporary Africa are ´no longer able to exercise the 
range of powers we usually associate with a sovereign nation-state, or even (in a 
few cases) to function at all as states in any conventional sense of the term` 
(2007:93). The solution presented by development agencies and a priority of 
external assistance is strengthening state institutions in core fields of statehood. 
The lists of state functions that needs to be addressed to overcome fragility varies, 
but always include institutions of the security sector, basic social services, the rule 
of law and legitimacy of the government (Boege et al. 2009:17). I would argue 
that there is a clear linkage between the capacity of the individual state in the 
region and the outcome of regional cooperation. I turn now to the second feature 
of the African state. 
Domestic politics in the African state is characterised of an interaction between 
formal institutions and informal practices. However, many scholars argue that 
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informal practices like highly personalized rule and patron-client networks prevail 
over formal institutions, thus influencing the process of state-formation (Bratton 
2008; Hyden 2007; Lindberg 2003; van de Walle 2002). I would argue that 
informal institutions are not a specific African phenomenon, it exists all over the 
world and the practice, per se, does not necessarily have restricting effects on 
state-formation, rather sometimes supporting ones. However, in neo-patrimonial 
systems informal practices will continue to challenge formal political and 
administrative institutions, because the later are overruled by informal patron-
client networks that dominate the political and socio-economic structure of the 
society (Bratton&van de Walle 1997:278; Hyden 2007:96; Jörgel&Utahs 
2007:52). Following Hyden, neo-patrimonial systems could be understood as a 
private and personalized system of rule rather than public realm that not separate 
the official sphere from the private realm (2007:229). Informal institutions exists 
side-by-side with formal institutions, but are so influential ´that it is their self-
regulating logic rather than such principles as transparency and accountability that 
determine the conduct of state agencies` (Hyden 2007:230). Thus, the prevalence 
of informal practices could be seen as the biggest challenge to formal institutions 
facing most African countries of today (Hyden 2007:265). The phenomenon of 
neo-patrimonialism is in its nature anti-democratic because it is based on the 
private appropriation of public goods (van de Walle 2002:69). A persistent pattern 
of neo-patrimonial politics therefore has a counteracting effect on the process of 
democratization (Lindberg 2006:121). I would argue that the phenomenon of neo-
patrimonialism in domestic politics partly could be identified in regional politics, 
illustrated by on one hand patron-client networks on the regional level, and on the 
other hand a pattern of executive dominance or ´presidentialism` in regional 
decision-making.  
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3. Methodological Considerations 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is on one hand to link philosophy of science to 
methodology, and on the other hand to discuss my basic methodological 
reflections on how to conduct the study. It is centered on three issues: (i) ontology 
or what exists in the world and how researchers conceptualize what they study; 
(ii) epistemology or how researchers know what they know about the world and 
how it is formulated and evaluated; (iii) methodology or how researchers select 
their specific research tools (cp. Jackson 2011:26). The chapter is structured in 
three sections that in turn discuss the choice of philosophy and how it influences 
the study, the selection of research method and case, and the collection of data and 
sources. 
 
 
3.1 Implications of Philosophy of Science 
 
The philosophy of science or the worldview from where one departs will have a 
significant influence on how the study is organized and conducted. Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson argues that positivism, or more adequate neo-positivism, has 
traditionally been the default position in IR, because it has more or less been 
compatible to most theories in the field (2011:204). Positivism means that the 
researcher positions himself/herself outside the social phenomenon of the study, 
i.e. an exogenic perspective, and draws his/her conclusion from what is only 
observable. From this follows the weakness of positivism that it not take in to 
consideration neither the influence of the mind of the researcher, nor what is 
unobservable, such as social structures and informal practices within the social 
fabric of the situation at hand. 
In the previous chapter I discussed the influence of the process of socialization, 
social learning and norm construction on the evolution of a RSC and its 
implication on the degree of security interdependence among its members. From 
this follows that my methodological approach needs to move beyond positivism 
towards a philosophical ontology based on a constructivist position where I view 
myself as participating in the construction of the knowledge of the phenomenon at 
hand, i.e. an endogenic perspective, without a clear line of demarcation between 
the mind of the researcher and the world (cp. Jackson 2011:115). In short, this 
means a constructivist focus on the socially constructed nature of knowledge and 
institutions, in this case the West African RSC and the way in which knowledge 
bear the marks of its social origin or represents nothing more than social 
constructions (cp. Sayer 2000:90). 
In constructivist methodology the real-but-unobservable mechanisms are 
replaced by imaginative analytical constructions, ideal-types, e.g. the Weberian 
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state or the Westphalian system, which are used to order the complexity of 
empirical reality into more comprehensible and manageable forms (cp. Jackson 
2011:113). The focus of this study on the ideas of regional security complex and 
security communities typically illustrates such ideal-types of social constructions. 
However, the methodology of constructivism should not be confused with the 
scientific ontology of constructivism used in political science that represents a set 
of foci such as norms, ideas and culture (Jackson 2011:141). 
Methodologically the study faces one major challenge. That is the 
consideration whether the constructivist notion of ideal-types of a Weberian state 
and a Westphalian system can be understood as universalistic or just a pure 
Eurocentric phenomenon that cannot be applied to other cultures and societies. 
The challenge here is that the Weberian state and the Westphalian system were 
never really transferred to the African continent, in the same way as it has been to 
other regions of the globe (Williams 2007:7). The Western ideal-type of state that 
is the assumption of most IR theories does simply not exist (Buzan&Waever 
2003:219).  Instead the African state needs to be interpreted as hybrid copy of the 
ideal-type of the Weberian state. This is not to say that ideal-types of states cannot 
be applied to the African region, however, it indicates that it has to be done with a 
high degree of context sensitivity and reflexivity.  
Like positivism, constructivism considers neither the unobservable nor 
normative questions, and is in its nature relativistic. Therefore, it is sometimes 
necessary to adopt a philosophy of critical social science, e.g. critical realism, 
feminism and post-colonialism, if one wants to move beyond the observable and 
empirical in order to produce knowledge, or addressing what is good and bad or 
what ought and ought not to be (Sayer 2000:161). Critical realism typically helps 
in identifying dispositional configurations and causal mechanisms and how they 
can be interpreted and understood (Brante 2001:74). From this follows that RSCs 
can be viewed on one hand as an imaginative ideal-type of construction and on the 
other hand as products of multiple components and forces that cannot be 
understood on the model of regular successions of events (cp. Sayer 2000:17). 
 
 
3.2 Research Method and Case Selection 
 
Case study research as a qualitative method is prevalent across a range of 
academic disciplines. Political science is not an exception. Acknowledging the 
impossibility of studying society as a whole, the case study offers a method from 
which to draw broader conclusions about social trends and developments based on 
the assumption that societies could be delimited and have a sufficient 
homogeneity that the right unit of analysis, or case, could provide a mirror on a 
broader social system (May 2011:221). Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett 
defines a case ´as an instance of a class of events`,  e.g. revolutions, types of 
government regimes or economic systems that are investigated regarding the 
causes of similarities or differences among those instances (2005:17). A case 
study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that one selects for 
analysis, rather than a historical event itself. The distinctiveness of the method lies 
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in the bounding and in the question; what is this a case of? (May 2011:231). 
Related to this study, regions among the world that has developed into RSCs 
represent a designated and integrated social phenomenon that easily could be 
defined historically and territorially as an instance of a class of events. From this 
follows that my thesis is a case of evolution of RSCs, delimited to the African 
context, and specifically West African. 
Rationales for choosing case study research vary from theory-building, theory-
development and theory-testing (George&Bennett 2005:109). Depending on one’s 
specific research objectives it is necessary to decide on how many cases to select 
and whether comparison is necessary. Many times the choice is about the extent 
of generalizing versus particularizing modes of interest, and how that is linked to 
the potential for different research aims (May 2011:221). As discussed in the 
previous chapter on theories and concepts my primary interest is to test and refine 
the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) by applying it to a particular 
region. While instrumental studies related to theory-building and theory-
development tend to involve multiple cases to seek analytic generalization with an 
optimum number of cases, intrinsic case studies are characterized of 
particularization and the specificity of a single case (May 2011:233). In this study 
it is depth not breadth that counts, and West Africa is chosen because it is 
revelatory and unusual among the approximately dozens (depending on how one 
cluster regions, sub-regions and super-regions) of regional security complexes 
(cp. Buzan&Weaver 2003). Compared to regions that represent more mature 
security complexes, e.g. Europe and North America, the African continent as a 
whole and the West African region in particular, typically form a security 
complex in being, thus, suitable for theory testing and refining. 
Regional cooperation in West Africa started out as a collective quest for self-
reliance and economic development. Shortly after its inception the region started 
to develop mechanisms for conflict prevention and management (Bah 2010:78). 
The current security framework makes West Africa in many aspects the 
forerunner in advanced mechanisms for addressing regional peace and security in 
Africa (Obi 2009:120). The AU mimics ECOWAS in many aspects (Utas&Jörgel 
2007:31). At the time of the establishment of the Peace and Security Protocol of 
the AU the West African security complex had already been in existence for a 
period of time and made varying degree of progress in peace and security. As one 
of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that constitute the African Peace 
and Security Architecture (APSA) ECOWAS had taken decisions before the birth 
of the AU on Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea 
Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire to establish essential components on the regional level 
which has come to characterize the APSA on the continental level 
(Elowson&MacDermott 2011:27). Clearly ECOWAS has developed an extensive 
normative framework for conflict prevention and management; however, as I will 
show, its capacity to move from rhetoric to practice has been dependent on the 
regional hegemon Nigeria and external actors, in particular, the former colonial 
powers, and the US and the UN. Thus, the choice of West Africa complies with 
the primary criterion of relevance for case selection to the research objectives of 
the study, and provides the kind of control and variation required by the research 
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problem (cp. George&Bennett 2005:83). My theoretical approach posits particular 
causal mechanisms, such as amity and enmity among member states, and the 
polarity or balance of power within the complex as an explanation of a particular 
case, but if these prove to be demonstrably absent, then the theory is greatly 
weakened as an explanation for this case. George and Bennett define causal 
mechanisms ´as ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological 
processes which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific 
contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities` 
(2005:137). 
Regions among the world are one and each complex social constructions and 
cannot easily be compared as most similar or least similar, nor crucial or deviant 
cases of actors in relation to the theoretical model of ideal-type of a RSC. From 
this follows the question whether conclusions from one specific region could be 
generalized to other regions. It is inevitable that the depth and understanding 
inherent in the analysis of a single, as compared with multiple, cases will differ 
significantly (May 2011:233). Comparison may be useful, but only to illuminate 
difference and not to ensure representativeness (May 2011:233). Comparison or 
multi-case investigations may contribute to the sum of total knowledge throw 
theorization. However, in-depth studies departure from a position that such a 
totalizing view is neither possible nor desirable given the complexities of the 
social world and its compositions of autonomous, irrational human actors (May 
2011:221-222). Contrary to the method of controlled comparison the within-case 
method chosen for this study allows for causal interpretation through the methods 
of congruence, process tracing or both. The features of the congruence method is 
that the research departs from a theory, in this study the RSCT, and then assess its 
ability to explain or predict the outcome of a particular case through investigating 
the variance in the independent variables and variance in the dependent variable 
(George&Bennett 2005:181). The method can take into consideration theoretical 
reasons why the hypothesized causes (ideational and material structures, 
influenced by penetration of external actors) vary in effect, or whether there are 
unexplained variance in the dependent variable (security interdependence) (cp. 
George&Bennett 2005:183). The objective of the method of process-tracing is to 
identify the intervening causal process (the causal chain and causal mechanism) 
between the independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable. 
George and Bennett argue that like the congruence test it is a method suitable to 
test theories in research with a constructivist approach in a social world that is 
characterized of multiple interaction and causality (2005:206). 
My research question - What are the mechanisms behind the region as a 
security provider in the case of West Africa? -  is operationalized in firstly the 
outcome of the process (the dependent variable) and secondly the variables that 
have an impact on the outcome. The outcome of the process of securitisation and 
desecuritisation is to what extent the members of the RSC are so interlinked that 
their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one 
another. In order to qualify as an RSC the members must possess a certain degree 
of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to 
differentiate them from the surrounding security regions (Buzan&Waever 
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2003:47). The independent variables depart from Bellamy´s analytical framework 
on security communities and are structured in two dimensions; the ideational 
aspects and the materialisation of the RSC. The ideational dimension is about how 
the RSC is constructed by assessing identities, interests and norms (formal and 
informal), while the material dimension focuses on the materialization of the RSC 
in terms of institutional, economic and social interaction and interdependence. 
Following Buzan, Waever and Bellamy my hypothesis is that the degree of 
security interdependence that decides on the evolution of the RSC is dependent 
on, firstly the polarity or distribution of power within the RSC, secondly the social 
construction or pattern of amity and enmity between the members of the RSC, and 
thirdly the penetration of external actors or ´outside` actors inside the RSC. These 
variables can in turn be analysed in terms of ideational structures (e.g. identities, 
interests and norms) and material aspects (e.g. institutions, political/military 
interaction). Inspired by the logic of experiment two questions could be asked. 
First, is the consistency spurious or of possible causal significance? Second, are 
the independent variables a necessary condition for the outcome of the dependent 
variable, and how much explanatory or predictive power do they have? The later 
question is important since a condition may be necessary but still contribute little 
to the explanation or prediction of the outcome of the process (cp. 
George&Bennett 2005:185). Following my methodological approach of 
constructivism, ideational structures have causal priority over material aspects. 
Ideational structures are therefore a necessary condition for the outcome of the 
dependent variable. Material structures and penetration of external actors are 
independent variables that are contributing causes, though neither necessary nor 
sufficient, however important for the degree of security interdependence.   
 
 
3.3 Data Collection and Sources 
 
The distinctiveness of the case study method lies in its bounding, however the 
methods of collecting data (interviewing, participant observation, documentary 
analysis etc.) are generic across the social sciences (May 2011:228). The main 
method of data collection for this thesis is documentary research, read on one 
hand as narratives of events, and on the other hand as accounts of aspiration, 
intentions and decision-making (cp. May 2011:192). Sources for documentary 
research include a wide variety, such as historical documents (declarations, 
statutes, protocols) and people´s accounts of incidents or periods in which they 
were actually involved (May 2011:194). Data required for this study is determined 
by my theoretical framework and my within-case study design. The data obtained 
should help achieve the objectives of the research and provide answers related to 
my hypothesis (cp. George&Bennett 2005:86-87). Documents could be 
approached from two different perspectives. The first is that they represent a 
reflection of reality, and social facts which exists independently of interpretation. 
The second perspective is to move beyond the idea that a document independently 
reports social reality and instead engage in a hermeneutic approach, where the 
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process of its production including the social context becomes important (May 
2011:198-199). 
The theoretical framework and the methodological approach of the thesis 
draws on academic works in political science, international relations and African 
politics, and literature on the philosophy of science and research in social science. 
The empirical part of the study builds on both primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources that are used consist of treaties, protocols, reports, resolutions 
etc. from ECOWAS, AU and UN. These official documents provide reliable and 
valid data on the evolution of ideational structures and the materialization of the 
West African RSC; however, they do not reveal the extent of observance of norms 
and rules of conduct. Another weakness is that protocols from key organs of 
ECOWAS are not official. Decisions taken are often made public through the 
issue of press releases without comments on the decision-making itself. Therefore, 
the study draws on secondary sources for the analysis of the observance of norms 
and rules of conduct, and strengths and weaknesses of capabilities related to the 
actual variations in the independent variables. Secondary sources consist of in 
principle of two types: articles in academic journals and material from research 
institutes and organizations. Some of the material includes valuable interviews 
with officials from ECOWAS and member states. Further on, I have to a limited 
extent used media as a source when covering most recent (2012) development in 
West Africa. 
In my criticism of the sources I found that scholars and institutes with different 
origin come to divergent assessments in their analysis of progress in peace and 
security made by ECOWAS. In most cases I have identified a significant variation 
on how to view its capabilities. The circumstance could to some extent be 
explained by, on one hand that the concept of security is not interpreted in the 
same way, and on the other hand the phenomenon of adaptation in which 
individuals adopt their expectations to the way of life they know (cp. Nussbaum 
2008:136). These conditions illustrates that documents do not stand on their own, 
and needs to be situated in the context in which they were produced (cp. May 
2011:209). Hence, I have scrutinized the material case by case and when useful 
and applicable balanced the use of sources with different origin. However, 
without being captured in the fallacy of bias I have deliberately searched for 
scientific publications and articles produced by African scholars attached to 
African institutions dealing with security studies on the African continent. Thus, 
my aim have been to come as close as possible to primary sources. 
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4. Focus on West Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the evolution of the West African 
Regional Security Complex (RSC). My point of departure is on one hand the 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), and on the other hand the research 
question; what are the mechanisms behind the region as a security provider, and 
the hypothesis that the degree of security interdependence that decides on the 
evolution of the RSC is dependent on, firstly the polarity or distribution of power 
within the RSC, secondly the social construction or pattern of amity and enmity 
between the members of the RSC, and thirdly the penetration of external actors or 
´outside` actors inside the RSC. Throughout the chapter these variables are 
analysed from two perspectives. The first is how the variables are related to the 
domestic, regional and global levels. The second is the influence of ideational 
structures, such as common norms and rules of conduct and the materialization of 
the RSC in terms of institutions and collective action. 
In the chapter on theories and concepts I introduced how one could distinguish 
on one hand between an international system and an international society, and on 
the other hand how that image of the division could be transferred to the regional 
level (cp. Buzan 2006:6-10). The process which transforms systems of states into 
societies of states and the construction of norms and institutions which makes up 
the political order represents ideas and concepts that in the case of this thesis is 
transferred and applied to the evolution of the West African RSC. I have 
identified three distinctive phases related to ideal-types of evolutionary steps in 
the process of securitisation and desecuritisation in the case of West Africa 
ranging from conflict transformation, through security regime to security 
community (cp. Buzan&Weaver 2003:53-54). These phases are not clear cut, and 
sometimes overlap each other, but could broadly in turn be related to three types 
of political order. The first step is the founding of the RSC, a period characterized 
of a Hobbesian anarchic system, conflict transformation and a pattern of security 
interdependence shaped by fear of war and rivalry. The second step is 
characterized of a Lockean model of security regime, ad hoc conflict management 
shaped by fear of war and rivalry, but a regime where fears and expectations are 
restrained by an agreed set of rules of conduct. The third step is the new security 
architecture characterized of a process of domestic democratization and 
liberalization, consolidation of the RSC and a move towards a Kantian model of 
security community where states do not expect or prepare for the use of force in 
their relations with each other (cp. Bellamy 2004:6). The method applied in my 
analysis is to identify the causal chain and the causal mechanisms between the 
independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable through an 
analysis on one hand of each step, and on the other hand the mechanisms that 
causes the transformation from one step to next step (cp. George&Bennett 
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2005:206). Thus, from a methodological point of view it is important to view the 
RSC not as a static entity, rather one that evolves over time depending on a 
combination of internal and external transformation, and as a result of a historical 
development. 
The chapter is structured in four sections. The first analyses the West African 
state in terms of on one hand similarities in historical and cultural values, colonial 
heritage, and political and socio-economic development, and on the other hand 
differences related to military-political power. The following sections analyses in 
proper order the three evolutionary steps of the RSC, i.e. the founding decade, ad 
hoc conflict management and the new security architecture. 
 
 
4.1 Weak State Dilemmas 
 
The community of West African states embraces a diverse variety of countries. 
The purpose of this section is to identify similarities and differences, as well as 
specificities, which may have an influence on the distribution of power within the 
RSC, and the pattern of amity and enmity among the member states. Factors that 
in turn have an impact on the degree of security interdependence and the 
evolution of the RSC. In the following I will focus on one hand on similarities that 
mainly could be found in shared historical and cultural values, colonial heritage, 
and political and socio-economic development, and on the other hand on 
differences that are more related to de jure military-political power. 
Strong historical and cultural ties formed by historic migration among the 
countries in the region, which could be dated back to pre-historical and pre-
colonial time, e.g. Loma and Kpelle cultures in Upper Guinea Forest, Ghana 
Empire and Mali Empire, and Ashanti Kingdom and Benin Kingdom has 
successfully been used to promote the establishment of West African unity by 
influential African leaders such as the first President of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah, 
the first President of Guinea Sekou Touré and Leopold Senghor of Senegal and 
Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria (cp. Murithi 2005:24; cp. Obi 2009:120). Thus, one 
could say that historical and cultural values are strong components of the RSC 
(cp. Bah 2005:79). However, these factors are also dependent on geographical 
proximity that differentiates the region from its neighbours (cp. Buzan&Weaver 
2003:53). Cultural affinity such as ´your brother´s keeper` was clearly used to 
justify the intervention in Liberia (Bah 2005:79) and in the promotion of the 
Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) within the community 
when the notion of ´shared frontiers` was used to convince member states that the 
country´s land borders should not be seen as barriers but rather as peaceful space 
that merely separates them (Bah 2005:79). From this would follow that the 
existence of shared historical and cultural values could be factors contributing to 
the evolution of the RSC. 
The majority of countries became independent states in early 1960s, with the 
exception of Ghana and Guinea that gained independence in 1957 and 1958. 
During the colonial period (1890s-1960s) the British controlled The Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Nigeria, while France unified Senegal, Guinea, Mali, 
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Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Niger into French West Africa. Portugal 
founded the colony of Guinea Bissau, while Germany claimed Togoland, but was 
forced to divide it between France and Britain following the First World War. 
Only Liberia has retained its independence, at the price of major territorial 
concessions. It had become an independent state already in 1847 as a settlement 
for freed slaves, dominated by Americo-Liberians, descendants of the first freed 
slaves that formed the political elite until the 1980s. The two dominant colonial 
masters, the United Kingdom (UK) and France have both made a remarkable 
colonial footprint concerning political, economic and social structures in the post-
independent state. It includes such areas as language, educational and judicial 
systems, and economic and commercial ties. Especially France retained a strong 
presence in its former colonies and still the region is divided in Anglophone and 
Francophone West Africa, exemplified by a common currency for the 
Francophone countries, except for Guinea, linked to the French Franc and now to 
the Euro, and links to transnational corporations dominated by French or English 
interests. The two Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde did not 
become independent states until 1974 and 1975 (CIA 2012:The World Factbook). 
The post-independent state embarked on a process of democratization and 
liberalization. However, the new political elite inherited a bifurcated state and 
structural defects created by colonialism and indirect rule that was not reformed 
and therefore failed to bridge the gap between the rural and the urban (Mamdani 
1996:296). Further on the post-colonial state was internationally recognized as 
independent states, however, lacked other essential capacities as sovereign states, 
among many things a government with control of its whole territory and borders. 
Under the overlay of the Cold War and the rivalry between the superpowers, most 
states, e.g. Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra 
Leone turned into authoritarian one-party or military regimes characterized of 
patrimonial rule and weak state capacity (Bratton&van de Walle 1997:3). It is 
important to note that this was the de facto domestic political landscape in the 
1970s and the point of departure for cooperation in the region and the founding 
period of the RSC.  
Military coups and brutal conflicts have been an infectious disease endemic to 
West Africa. Since independence, many West African countries have been 
submerged under political instability, with notable civil wars in Nigeria, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau. Between 1963, when the first 
elected president of Togo was overthrown and 2000 West Africa experienced 27 
military coups, and most recently one in Mali on 21 March 2012 when a military 
mutiny led to a spontaneous coup d'état. In Guinea Bissau no elected president 
has completed a term. Senegal stands out as never having had the military 
meddling in politics, and Côte d'Ivoire, although currently instable only in 1999. 
The pattern seems to be common; when domestic economic conditions become 
intolerable or security cannot be provided, and ministers grow fat on greed and 
corruption the military steps in and claim to be the safeguards of the people and to 
restore order (Ohene 2012). From this follows that the security sector itself has 
been a major source of insecurity in West Africa (Aning 2004:534). I would argue 
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that this phenomenon could be explained by the lack of democratic control of the 
security sector related to the weak state and the legitimacy of the state.  
In the 1990s a wave of democratization spread to West Africa that could be 
understood from both a domestic perspective and in the context of global and 
regional changes. The end of the Cold War, the break-up of the Sovjet Union and 
the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 
1980s had an overall influence on changes in the global and regional political 
landscape (Carothers 2002:5). It was followed by an uncompromising critique of 
single-party regimes, however, in the West African context followed by equally 
single-minded, prescriptive and explosive reforms (Mamdani 1996:300). Among 
the causes for the onset of the transition were international pressure for 
democratisation and domestic public grievance with governments that did not 
deliver public goods. These causes formed domestic opinions that in many cases 
resulted in popular protest (cp. Bratton&van de Walle 1997:144). Popular protest 
in one country often had a regional domino effect (Liviga 2009:7). Although, 
most West African countries went through a transition from one-party states to 
multi-party systems they continued to be dominated by one party with its origin in 
the one-party state, and former authoritarian rulers or their associates 
(Bratton&van de Walle 1997:196). Whereas the single-party system had been a 
way to contain social and political fragmentation in the inherited colonial state, 
many multi-party regimes tended towards a shallow democratization (Mamdani 
1996:290). Attempts to reform the inherited bifurcated state, turned out to be not 
only superficial, but also explosive. These circumstances provided the ground for 
hybrid political systems, combining authoritarian and democratic elements that 
thereafter have continued to affect domestic transformation, and in some cases 
lead to state collapse, privatisation of security and warlordisation that 
characterised the ad hoc conflict management of the second phase of the evolution 
of the RSC. 
In the 2000s democratic principles have taken hold in most member states. In 
terms of advancing political rights and civil liberties only Cape Verde, Ghana and 
Benin could be ranked as free, whereas most countries remain hybrid regimes or 
transitional democracies (Freedom House 2012). The tendency of domestic 
transformation is illustrated by reduced incidence of civil wars and military coups, 
with the exception of Niger and Mali, and repetitive democratic elections 
followed by peaceful alternation of power, e.g. in Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Sierra Leone (AED 2012). Côte d'Ivoire marks the exception from this tendency 
when the first post-conflict elections in 2010 resulted in post-election violence 
that almost turned the country back into civil war (ICG 2011a; ICG 2011b; ICG 
2011c). 
While political domestic transformation has led to increased political rights and 
civil liberties, socio-economic development in West African countries remain 
poor. The member states of the RSC are, with the exception of Cape Verde and 
Ghana, ranked in terms of human development and income per capita as being the 
less developed and poorest in the world (UNDP 2012; World Bank 2012). 
However, regionally there is a large divide between different layers of the 
population and the countries. Four countries, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and 
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Senegal represents 72 percentages of the population and accounts for 86 
percentages of the regions total GDP, and holds a remarkable higher income per 
capita than the other states in the region. Among these countries Ghana is one of 
the fastest growing economies in the world (World Bank 2012). However, one 
country, Nigeria sticks out as a giant among the states in the region. 
Nigeria could be described as a regional hegemon that on its account of its 
population of 163 Million (out of 309 Million in the region), its geographical size, 
and relatively large economy that represents 65 percentages of the regions GDP 
has a significant influence on the distribution of power within the RSC. The 
country is among the world´s top dozen largest oil producers and it is a large 
exporter of oil to the US (12 % of US oil), and possess gas reserves that could 
supply Western Europe for a decade (World Bank 2012). Nigerian military 
expenditures represent two thirds of total expenditures in the region and it holds 
an 85,000 strong army, and is the only state in the region that has a potent navy 
and air force within its armed forces (SIPRI 2012). Nigerian foreign policy and 
hegemonic aspirations are based on the fact that it is the country with the largest 
black population in the world and that one in every five African is Nigerian, has 
exhibited a missionary zeal, an enthusiasm that has claimed a special 
responsibility to protect and speak on behalf of black people (Adebajo 2010:414). 
The paradox here is that Nigeria, with all its regional aspirations throughout the 
evolution of the RSC, has not been able to manage domestic political and socio-
economic problems. It has been under military rule for most of its time after 
independence, and domestic politics remains to be dominated by patron-client 
networks and control over oil revenues, as oil accounts for the vast majority of 
federal incomes (Reno 1998:207; Lewis 2003:134-136; LeVan&Ukata 2011:1). 
Attempts to a transition to democracy have several times been broken by military 
interventions. The first multi-party election was held in 1993, but the election 
results were directly annulled by the military regime. A civilian caretaker 
governed briefly until General Sani Abacha took power. Abacha’s dictatorial 
regime dissolved all democratic structures and banned political parties, governing 
through a predominantly military Provisional Ruling Council (PRC). After 
Abacha´s demise legislative election was held in 1998; however, all participating 
political parties were affiliated with the government while the true opposition was 
prevented from participation. In the presidential election 1999 Olusegun 
Obasanjo, a former general, won the elections and under his rule the country 
begun a process of democratization (Freedom House 2010b). It is noticeable to 
mark that domestic political conditions have gone parallel to on one hand the 
Nigerian dominated military interventions by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone in the early 1990s, and on the other hand the changes in Nigerian foreign 
policy in the late 1990s. It is noticeable to mark that the evolutionary steps of the 
RSC in many aspects could be linked to variations in Nigerian domestic politics, a 
matter to which I turn in the following sections. 
 
 
  
23 
 
4.2 Founding Decade 
 
The founding period 1975-1990 should be interpreted in the context of the post-
independent state, one-party regimes, the Cold War overlay, and most significant 
a pattern of security interdependence shaped by fear of war and rivalry. In this 
section I analyse the origin of the RSC, initial norms and rules of conduct and the 
establishment of key institutions. 
 
 
4.2.1 Norms and Rules of Conduct 
 
The regional cooperation in West Africa started out as a cooperative, economic 
and integration project by the signing of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) Treaty of Lagos (hereafter the Treaty) on 25 May 1975 
(ECOWAS 2012a). The focus of the Treaty was mainly regional economic 
integration and did not provide for any security related provisions. After its 
inception the nexus between security and development, as well as its impact on 
security interdependence in the region became increasingly clear for leaders 
among the member states (Bah 2005:78). In 1977 Francophone West Africa, 
except Guinea, entered into a non-aggression pact, the Accord de Non Agression 
et d`Assistance en Matiere de Defense (ANAD). Consequently, ECOWAS 
established two protocols to deal with regional security. The first was the Protocol 
of Non-aggression (PNA) in 1978. Its main objective was to ensure an 
environment free from fear of attack or aggression by one state towards another. 
The second was the 1981 Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD), in 
which members agreed that ´… any armed threat or aggression directed against 
any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the community 
…` (ECOWAS 2012a). While the former provided essentially for peaceful 
resolutions of disputes between member states, the later detailed situations that 
would call for joint action on external aggression, as well as intervention in inter-
state and intra-state conflicts. Thus, these protocols could be viewed as an early 
attempt to establish common norms and rules of conduct in an anarchic system 
being more motivated by logic of consequence rather than logic of 
appropriateness. It could be interpreted in two different ways. The first and 
broader interpretation is that the need for peace and security expressed in the early 
protocols hereafter has shaped the evolution of ECOWAS (Aning 2004:534). The 
second and narrow one is that with time the two protocols were found to be 
limited in scope and criticized for being mere aspirations that were never really 
implemented because of the lack of political will among the member states 
(Elowson&MacDermott 2010:23-24). The later interpretation would be relevant 
when analysing the second evolutionary step of the RSC in the following section. 
However, I would argue that the former interpretation and the early attempt to 
establish norms and rules of conduct, despite its shortcomings, could be seen as a 
forerunner to the development of norms and rules of conduct that would follow in 
the evolution of the RSC. 
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4.2.2 Key Institutions 
 
The Treaty established the key institutions of the ECOWAS, i.e. the Authority of 
Heads of State and Government (hereafter the Authority); the Council of 
Ministers; the Secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary (later transformed 
into the Commission). The Authority is the supreme institution of ECOWAS 
responsible for the general direction and control of the organization that decides 
on general policies and guidelines (ECOWAS 2012b:Art.7). It consists of the 
member states´ Heads of State and Government, scheduled to meet at least once a 
year with a chairmanship to be decided on a rotational principle. Decisions taken 
by the Authority are binding to the member states and institutions (ECOWAS 
2012b:Art.9). The Council of Ministers is comprised of ministers from member 
states and is responsible for the functioning and development of the community. It 
is to make recommendations to the Authority, issue directives in the field of 
economic integration, and to approve work programs and budgets of the 
ECOWAS institutions. Regulations issued by the Council are binding to the 
institutions under its authority and member states if the Authority has delegated 
power to the Council (ECOWAS 2012b:Art.12). The Treaty, however, did not 
include any specific key institution under the Authority related to security 
mechanisms that later would expose the shortcomings of the Treaty and the 
security related protocols when civil wars broke out in the region. 
 
 
4.2.3 Observations 
 
From the discussion on the first evolutionary step of the RSC follows three key 
observations. The first is that the polarity or distribution of power within the RSC 
was formed on one hand by the overlay of the Cold War, and on the other hand by 
the rivalry between Anglophone and Francophone West Africa, partly driven by 
French interests in the region. The second observation is that amity and enmity 
among the member states in the RSC was linked to the weak state that cannot 
control its territory or border and the fear for inter-state rivalry and conflicts. The 
third observation is that the social construction of norms and rules of conduct 
focused on inter-state relations rather than intra-state conflict management and 
root causes of domestic conflict. Norms and rules of conduct were, however, not 
materialized in institutions related to security mechanisms. Despite its 
shortcomings, the founding phase recognized the need for increased regional 
security responsibility, and thus paved the way for the next phase when civil wars 
broke out in the region, a matter to which I turn next. 
 
 
4.3 Ad Hoc Conflict Management 
 
The 1990s could be considered as a crucial step in the evolution of the RSC. The 
phase should be interpreted in the context of the post-Cold War era and the 
removal of the superpower overlay followed by increased regional security 
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responsibility. The period is characterized of domestic transition to multi-party 
state, in some cases collapse of state, violent conflict and civil wars, and when it 
comes to the evolution of the RSC ad hoc conflict management. In this section I 
analyse the revised security framework, the collapse of state in some member 
countries and the military interventions that lay bare the weakness of the Treaty 
and early security protocols.  
 
 
4.3.1 Revised Treaty 
 
The outbreak of violent conflict in the region and subsequent military 
interventions in the civil wars in Liberia (1990-1997 and again in 2003), Sierra 
Leone (1993-2000), Guinea Bissau (1998-1999) and Côte d'Ivoire (2003) 
represents a turning point in the RSC. When civil war broke out in Liberia in 1990 
and a year later spread to Sierra Leone it stood clear that the conflicts were related 
to each other and had regional dimensions, although the root causes of conflict 
had its origins primarily in internal grievance and protests against incumbent 
corrupt and authoritarian regimes (Obi 2009:122-126). The conflicts that followed 
in Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire had both internal and external explanations; 
however, like the earlier conflicts they rather quickly got regional implications. 
The former resulting in spill-over effects to nearby Senegal and Guinea, and the 
later conflict related to the earlier conflicts in the Mano River Basin (Obi 
2009:126-130). The regional nature of the conflicts was further complicated by 
the presence of natural resources, e.g. diamond, iron ore and timber that fueled the 
conflicts and sucked in international actors (Bah 2005:79). Thus, one could say 
that the inter-linked nature of the conflicts in the region reinforced the security 
interdependence among states in the region. However, there are two diverging 
versions on how to interpret this period. On one hand it could be interpreted as a 
case of successful regional conflict management and restoration of peace and 
security (Adebajo 2010:432), on the other hand it could be described as a ´heroic 
failure` orchestrated by authoritarian rulers to secure regime survival (Gberie 
2003:148). My point of departure is that the military interventions in the 1990s 
and the lessons learned from that experience paved the way for the following 
evolution and the social construction of norms and rules of conduct, genuine 
institutionalization, and a new and strengthened peace and security framework 
that I will return to in the analysis of the third evolutionary step (cp. Obi 
2009:120). 
During this period The Treaty was revised in 1993 with the purpose on one 
hand to accelerate economic integration and enhance political cooperation, 
exemplified by the aims of the Revised Treaty (hereafter the Treaty) ´… to 
promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic 
union in West Africa …` (ECOWAS 2012b:Art.1), and on the other hand to give 
greater emphasis on peace and security, exemplified by the adherence to 
fundamental principles such as ´… non-aggression between Member States … 
maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and 
strengthening of good neighbourliness … peaceful settlement of disputes among 
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Member States, active co-operation between neighbouring countries and 
promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development 
…` (ECOWAS 2012b:Art.4). Thus, these principles together aimed at creating 
shared norms and rules of conduct in matters related to the security 
interdependence in the region that had not been a part of the original Treaty. With 
regard to regional security the Treaty highlights that ´… Member States undertake 
to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of 
peace, stability and security within the region … to co-operate with the 
Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the 
timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and inter-State conflicts …` 
(ECOWAS 2012b:Art.58). Thus, the revised Treaty gives weight to the 
responsibility of both the Community and its member states to work together to 
ensure regional peace and security. Beside the emphasis on regional peace and 
security the principle of supra-nationality in the application of decisions is one 
major change to the original treaty, illustrated in the preamble to the Treaty that 
´… the integration of the Member States into a viable regional Community may 
demand the partial and gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the 
Community within the context of a collective political will …` (ECOWAS 
2012b:Preamble). 
The Treaty confirmed the key institutions from the original Treaty, but also 
established the Community Parliament (ECOWAS 2012b:Art.13). The Parliament 
did not hold its first meeting until 200. It is noticeable to mark that the role of the 
Parliament was not specified in the Treaty itself, a circumstance that over time has 
continued to create antagonism between the Parliament and other key institutions, 
in particular, the Authority and the Secretariat (later the Commission). The 
Parliament consists of representatives from the member states selected by the 
national parliaments. There are 115 seats, which are divided between the member 
states depending on the sizes of the state. Hence, Nigeria has 35 seats, Ghana 8, 
Côte d'Ivoire 7, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal 6 and the rest five 
each (ECOWAS 2012f). The Community Court of Justice was decided on in 
1991, confirmed in the Treaty but was not set up until 2001. It consists of seven 
judges selected and appointed by the Authority. Judgments of the Court are 
binding on ECOWAS, member states, institutions and corporate bodies 
(ECOWAS 2012b:Art.15). Although, the Treaty included security provisions it 
did not establish key institutions to deal specifically with peace and security. I 
would relate this shortcoming to the parallel engagement of ECOWAS in the 
conflicts in the Mano River Basin and that the process was blocked by the unequal 
distribution of power, i.e. the domination of Nigeria within the region and the 
enmity between Anglophone and Francophone West Africa. 
 
 
4.3.2 Military Interventions 
 
After the outset of the conflict in Liberia it stood clear that the original Treaty and 
early security protocols would not provide enough mechanisms for collective 
action. Following a Nigerian initiative ECOWAS decided to set up a Standing 
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Mediation Committee (SMC) that in turn established ECOWAS Cease-fire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that was given the mandate to monitor and to 
effect a cease-fire in Liberia (Aning 2004:534). The action was defended on the 
basis to stop an unfolding humanitarian crisis and to stop the spread of the conflict 
to neighbouring states burdened by a steady stream of refugees and militias 
crossing the borders (Obi 2009:122). With the superpowers relaxing their grip on 
their former client states, following the end of the Cold War, I would argue that 
members of the RSC took on a central role in managing security in their own 
backyard. Thus, the decision, notwithstanding its shortcomings, to send an 
intervention force to Liberia and Sierra Leone, and later to Guinea Bissau and 
Côte d'Ivoire, should be seen in the light of a clear recognition of security 
concerns within the region (Gberie 2003:148-149; Bah 2005:79). In the following 
I will show how the ad hoc conflict management illustrates three features of the 
phase, related to both internal and external transformation that together had an 
influence on the evolution of the RSC from conflict transformation through 
regime security to security community (cp. Buzan&Weaver 2003:53). 
The first characteristic was the fear among leaders that insurgency against 
incumbent regimes in one country would spread across borders and encourage 
similar movements in their own country and subsequent internal instability (cp. 
Obi 2009:122). I would link this fear to the dilemmas of the weak state and lack 
of political legitimacy of incumbent regimes. Thus, one could say that it was not 
concerns of regional security, rather concerns driven by regime security and elite 
interests that were important factors for intervention. A circumstance that could be 
illustrated by the Nigerian-led interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone that were 
seen by the most important warring factions the National Patriotic Front for 
Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor and the Revolutionary United Front in 
Sierra Leone, rather as an interventionist force seeking to save the dictatorship of 
incumbent Presidents Samuel K. Doe and Joseph S. Momoh from collapse (cp. 
Obi 2009:123). Outside perception of the interventionist force was the fact that 
almost all leaders contributing troops were military men who had seized power in 
coups or in controversial circumstances (Gberie 2003:148). Thus, the 
interventions were seen by some as a serious attempt of regional peace-keeping, 
while by others as an ill-conceived and regional divisive action by autocratic 
leaders (Gberie 2003:149). 
The second characteristic is how the pattern of amity inside on one hand 
Anglophone West Africa and on the other hand Francophone West Africa and the 
subsequent enmity between Anglophone and Francophone countries influenced 
conflict management and collective action of ECOWAS. African scholars 
(Adebajo 2008; Aning 2004; Obi 2009) agree that the decision to intervene in 
Liberia and the decision to extend the mandate of ECOMOG to include Sierra 
Leone was a Nigerian and Anglophone initiative taken by the SMC comprised of 
only The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. It was taken against the 
expressed will of the most important warring faction, NPFL, and without any 
cease-fire agreement or sanction by the UN. The intervention was not supported 
by Francophone West Africa, except nearby Guinea that was heavily affected by 
the conflicts in both Liberia and Sierra Leone (Gberie 2003:148). The pattern of 
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amity and enmity was further complicated by the fact that incumbent regimes in 
both Liberia and Sierra Leone were supported by Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea, 
while the rebellion in Liberia was backed by Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. The 
later support partly driven by family ties between Charles Taylor and President 
Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire and President Blaise Campoare in 
Burkina Faso, and the former by the personal friendship between incumbent 
President Doe in Liberia and Nigerias´s military president General Ibrahim 
Babangida in Nigeria (Obi 2009:123). In the case of Sierra Leone in the late 
1990s it was the friendship between President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and General 
Sani Abacha in Nigeria, and President Lansana Conté in Guinea, and the fact that 
Charles Taylor kept up his support for rebel groups in both Sierra Leone and 
Guinea (Obi 2009:125). The interlinked wars in the Manor River Basin illustrated  
how an intricate network of political and business entrepreneurs can exacerbate 
conflicts by privatizing war (Adejumobi 2004:69). Thus, one could say that 
regional conflict management in the early 1990s and the establishment of 
ECOMOG were highly influenced by on one hand structural conditions of amity 
and enmity between Anglophone and Francophone West Africa, and on the other 
hand the influence of a few leaders linked together in a regional patron-client 
network. 
In the cases of Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire the situation had partly 
changed due to the circumstance that ECOMOG, in particular, its hegemon 
Nigeria was already engaged and overstretched by the conflicts in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, and therefore not interested in new commitments, which in turn 
offered room for new actors. In Guinea Bissau the intervention took place in the 
context of its shift in international relations from its traditional ties to Portugal to 
closer ties with France and neighbouring Francophone countries. The conflict was 
triggered by accusations that the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Ansumane 
Mane had been involved in the illegal supply of arms to rebels operating in 
Casamance in Southern Senegal (Obi 2009:126). Thus, Senegal had security 
concerns related to the activities of rebels across its borders with Guinea Bissau 
and The Gambia. After a military coup attempt the incumbent President Joao 
Vieira appealed for help from Senegal and Guinea according to bilateral defense 
pacts, and the day of the coup Senegalese troops were already in Bissau and the 
following day troops arrived from Guinea (Obi 2009:127). Like the interventions 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the intervention was undertaken without the blessing 
of the full ECOWAS authority or the UN. Amity and enmity among the 
participating countries was again characterized of close friendship among leaders 
and a fear that the conflict could spread to neighbouring countries. For Senegal it 
was important to support the incumbent regime and not let a regime friendly to the 
rebels in southern Senegal come into power. Guinea and President Conté was 
acting on the basis of ´friendship` with President Vieira and wanted to ensure that 
refugees from Guinea Bissau did not add the pressure on Guinea already burdened 
by large number of refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone. In November 1998 
ECOWAS urged Senegal and Guinea to withdraw their troops, which instead 
were replaced by ECOMOG peace-keepers from Benin, Mali, Niger, Togo and 
The Gambia with French support. In spite of ECOMOG´s presence and the 
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support from external actors (France, Portugal and the US) fighting continued and 
in May 1999 General Mane successfully seized power. ECOMOG forces did not 
intervene and were shortly thereafter withdrawn (Obi 2009:128). Thus, my 
conclusion is that the shortcomings of the intervention in Guinea Bissau could 
partly be explained by the absence of the regional hegemon Nigeria and the lack 
of support from the whole authority of the RSC.  
In the case of Côte d'Ivoire intervention took place in the context of on one 
hand rapid domestic deterioration of the economic situation and internal division 
along ethnic and religious lines, and on the other hand the aftermath of the 
interventions in nearby Liberia and Sierra Leone. The, in 2002, elected President 
Laurent Gbagbo was supported by France that actively intervened in the conflict 
with French troops in the country and by Burkina Faso, while veterans from the 
civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone took part as mercenaries in rebel groups in 
the north and the west, believed to be supported by Charles Taylor (Obi 
2009:128). After mediation by ECOWAS and France, followed by a peace accord 
in early 2003 ECOWAS took the decision to send a cease-fire monitoring mission 
made up of mainly Francophone countries (Senegal, Ghana, Niger, Togo and 
Benin) along with French troops. With France playing a key diplomatic and 
military role, as did the UK in the case of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS got support by 
a SC resolution establishing a UN observer mission in the country. Like in the 
case of Guinea Bissau, Nigeria again was absent from the ECOWAS mission, 
limiting itself only to a mediatory role. Instead the ECOWAS mission in Côte 
d'Ivoire, similar to Guinea Bissau was made possible through French and 
international support. In late 2003 the SC adopted a resolution, following the 
pattern from its engagement in Liberia and Sierra Leone, that established a UN 
peace-keeping hybrid mission in Côte d'Ivoire, transforming ECOWAS troops, 
merging UN forces and cooperation with the French forces (in Sierra Leone UK 
troops) into one coordinated operation. Followed by mediation by AU, based on 
ECOWAS request and UN support a peace agreement was reached in 2005 
(Freedom House 2010a). Thus, I would argue that it was the international 
community and the UN comprehensive approach to the conflicts in the Mano 
River Basin, and the subsequent establishment of sustainable and coordinated 
missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, that paved the way for a new 
turn in the evolution of the RSC. 
The third characteristic is how the unequal distribution of power in the region 
affected the military interventions. The RSC was depending on one hand on 
Nigeria on grounds of its capacity and military-political power, and on the other 
hand on assistance from external actors with historical and/or strategic/economic 
interests in the region, inter alia France, a long-standing hegemonic rival of 
Nigeria in West Africa (Gberie 2003:148). Nigeria´s role was large in the conflict 
management of the 1990s and without Nigeria there would probably have been no 
regional intervention in the civil wars in the Mano River Basin (Adebajo 
2010:424). While the country had regional hegemonic aspirations, the interests of 
the leaders and military elite were important. Competing domestic pressure and 
changing priorities of various regimes had implications on its foreign policy, 
shifting between direct military interventionism to more mediatory and preventive 
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roles. Nigerian foreign policy and leadership aspirations, illustrated by the 
expression Pax Nigeriana (Adebajo 2010:420) could be interpreted from partly 
logic of consequence, and partly logic of appropriateness. Some explain Nigeria´s 
regional aspirations, by its leaders images of themself as great leaders, a desire to 
leave an indelible mark on Nigeria´s history, and the aspirations of the Nigerian 
army to enhance its status and to prove its worth as a national and regional asset 
(Adebajo 2008:187). It could, however, as well be interpreted as a pure attempt to 
deflect attention from, and interrogations of, domestic human rights abuses 
(Adebajo 2010:423). 
The unequal distribution of power in the region also created a fear of Nigerian 
dominance (Bah 2005:79). One could say that this fear to some extent pushed 
smaller countries in the region into the guardianship of external actors, as in the 
case of the interventions in Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire. Such fears resulted 
in a ´French-overlay` that was partly hindering the development of the security 
architecture in West Africa. France that had maintained strong economic interests 
and high military presences in the region after decolonialisation became 
increasingly important in Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire. Nigeria´s hegemonic 
role was manifested through the fact that it provided at least 80 percentages of 
troops in the two first interventions (12,000 out of 16,000 in Liberia and 12,000 
out of 13,000 in Sierra Leone) and 90 percentages of the founding (Adebajo 
2010:425-426). Despite its capabilities and stretched to its limit, Nigeria began to 
count its costs and decided to draw down its participation in ECOMOG. However, 
the ease out of operations could also be viewed in the light of transition to civilian 
rule and a shift in domestic policy following the democratic elections in 1999. 
Further on, the ECOMOG forces throughout its operations were plagued by poor 
preparations, limited resources and capacity in relation to its ambitious mandate 
(Obi 2009:128). In both the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone it was the 
combination of Nigerian drawdown and the general lack of capacity and resources 
that was one of the reasons for UN to take over the peace-keeping role. However, 
it also made it possible for the UK, France, and US to gain an influence on the 
outcome of the conflicts and post-conflict transformation. The lessons from re-
hatting ECOMOG forces into UN peace-keepers are also relevant and show that 
´African solutions to African problems´ is partly in the need of international 
support. I would argue that it was the merged and hybrid missions that followed 
after the initial ECOMOG interventions that finally brought peace and security to 
the region. However, it was the initial regional response that played a crucial role 
in early conflict management that paved the way for the establishment of later 
successful UN missions. One could say that after ECOMOG had done the 
spadework UN peace-keeper in some respects came in to take credit. 
 
 
4.3.3 Observations 
 
From the analysis of the second evolutionary step of the RSC follows five 
observations. The first is the lesson learned that instability in one country in the 
region could not be contained in that state alone, thus, possessing a grave danger 
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to the security and stability of nearby states, and reinforcing the security 
interdependence in the region. In particular, the civil war in Liberia had a domino 
effect on its immediate neighbours through the proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons, hundreds of thousands of refugees and movement of combatants 
across borders. The second observation is the need to address root causes of 
conflict linked to the dilemmas of the weak state. The conflicts in West Africa 
bespeak on one hand the need for better links between security and development, 
and on the other hand good governance and democracy. The third observation is 
the gap between on one hand norms and rules of conduct and on the other hand 
institutional capacity and resources. ECOWAS capacity mirrored the capacity of 
its member states that hampered effective and sustainable conflict management. 
However, on one hand the community showed the ability to take timely action and 
responsibility for its on security when stability in the region was threatened, but 
on the other hand sustainable conflict management was made possible only 
through the assistances of external actors. The forth observation is the unequal 
distribution of power and Nigeria´s role as a regional hegemon and the notion of 
Pax Nigeriana. Its role was large in the conflict management of the 1990s and 
without Nigeria there would probably have been no regional intervention in the 
civil wars. While the country had regional aspirations, interests of its leaders and 
military elite were important. The lesson learned is that the unequal distribution of 
power needs to be addressed with more ´suitable` or ´stable` mechanisms in the 
security architecture. The fifth observation is the impact of external actors with 
historical and/or strategic/economic interests in the region. As Nigeria decided to 
ease out of operations the UK, France and UN came to play important roles as 
partners along ECOWAS in the interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea 
Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire. 
 
 
4.4 New Security Architecture 
 
The third evolutionary step should be interpreted in the context of the experiences 
and lessons learned from on one hand the collapse of state in some member states, 
and on the other hand the ad hoc conflict management and military interventions 
in the previous phase. The contemporary period is characterized of domestic 
processes of democratization and liberalization, consolidation of the RSC, 
establishment of a new security architecture and a move towards a society of 
states and a security community in being where states do not expect or prepare for 
the use of force in their relations with each other (cp. Buzan&Weaver 2003:471).  
 
 
4.4.1 New Norms and Rules of Conduct 
 
The outbreak of violent conflicts in the region and ECOWAS subsequent 
interventions marked a turning point in the RSCs architecture. In this section I 
will show how contemporary West Africa is in the process of evolving from a 
security regime to a security community (cp. Bah 2005:82). I would argue that it 
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was the lessons learned from the inter-linked nature of the conflicts in the Mano 
River Basin and the following ad hoc conflict management that reinforced the 
security interdependence in the region, urging the social construction of norms 
and rules of conduct, and the establishment of genuine security institutions (cp. 
Suifon 2004:8). These factors, coupled with close cultural and historical ties, 
geographical proximity clearly qualifies the region as a security complex. Thus, 
the contemporary security framework is aimed at the institutionalization of 
conflict resolution mechanisms and a move away from the ad hoc approach of the 
1990s (cp. Bah 2005:77). While the early security protocols and Treaty 
empowered signatory states to respond to different domestic and regional 
conflicts, the collapse of Liberia and Sierra Leone convinced West African leaders 
to work on creating a more permanent, stronger security framework designed to 
prevent future state failure (cp. Aning 2004:534). Parallel the UN issued The 
Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa (1998) that emphasized the need to develop and reinforce 
the capabilities of African states to undertake peace-keeping operations in states 
and to carry out forceful interventions in states with conflicts that create 
humanitarian catastrophes and normative collapse (UN 1998). 
The security protocols and the Treaty could be seen as the first formal steps to 
the contemporary security framework from 1999 known as the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security 
(hereafter the Mechanism) (ECOWAS 2012c). One could say that the Mechanism 
marks an important turning point in the evolution of the RSC (Berman&Sams 
2002:49). It was created in the aftermath of the interventions in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone and represents the central legal, institutional and political statute and 
effectively replaces the security protocols and the Treaty. The Mechanism is an 
ambitious and comprehensive strategic framework which details different areas 
for collaboration, outlines the roles of institutions and organs concerned with 
peace and security, as well as gives security directives on how the mechanism is 
to be applied in different situations (ECOWAS 2012c; cp. Aning 2007:535; cp. 
Elowson&MacDermott 2010:24). The objectives of the Mechanism, are to ´… 
prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-State conflicts … implement the 
relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised Treaty … strengthen cooperation 
in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, peace-keeping operations, the 
control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small 
arms and anti-personnel mines … maintain and consolidate peace, security and 
stability within the Community …` (ECOWAS 2012c:Art.3). Thus, it includes 
supra-national elements and a clear statement to materialize norms related to 
regional security and collective conflict management. The Mechanism also 
contains provisions to constitute and deploy a civilian and military force including 
peace enforcement operations (ECOWAS 2012c:Art.28; cp. Abass 2000:213; cp. 
Ismail 2008:25). It makes West Africa in many aspects the forerunner in advanced 
mechanisms for addressing regional peace and security in Africa and it has partly 
become a model on which much of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) on the continental level was structured (AU 2000; AU 2002; 
Elowson&MacDermott 2010:27; Obi 2009:119; Utas&Jörgel 2007:31). 
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The realization of the need to deal with the root causes behind conflict gave 
rise to The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance supplementary to the 
Mechanism (hereafter the Protocol) from 2001 that deals with root causes of 
conflict (ECOWAS 2012d), while the Mechanism itself can be seen as dealing 
with the more immediate causes. The ambition was to emphasize the preventive 
aspect of conflict, along conflict management and peace-building. It addresses 
constitutional issues, such as separation of powers and zero tolerance to 
unconstitutional changes of government, popular participation and 
decentralization of power, and democratic control of armed forces (ECOWAS 
2012d:Art.1, Art.20). Further on, the Protocol details the conditions for 
democratic elections and election monitoring, and allows for the imposition of 
sanctions ´… in the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any 
means or where there is a massive violation of Human Rights in a Member state 
ECOWAS may impose sanctions on the State concerned …` (ECOWAS 
2012d:Art.2-18, Art.45), illustrated by the suspension of Guinea after the military 
coup in 2008, sanctions on Niger in 2010 after an attempt of unconstitutional 
maintenance of power and sanctions on Mali after the military coup in 2012.  
The Mechanism and the Protocol form the basis of the ECOWAS Conflict 
Prevention Framework (ECPF) from 2008 (ECOWAS 2012e). Since the two 
former documents do not go into detail on how to operationalize the 
implementation of the agreements the ECPF is an effort to move towards concrete 
action for the community, illustrated by ´… the overall aim of the ECPF is to 
strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa …` (ECPF 
2012e:Art.27). Experiences from previous phase has given rise to the need of 
including an emerging civil society as a key partner in the promotion of peace and 
security (Suifon 2004:10; Adejumobi 2004:76), illustrated by the vision to 
transform the region from ´an ECOWAS of States into an ECOWAS of the 
Peoples` (ECOWAS 2012e:Art.4). The ECPF is designed to play more attention 
to positive peace, i.e. the absence of structural and indirect violence (Galtung 
1969:170) through a more comprehensive peace-building strategy, in post-conflict 
and non-conflict settings, where focus lies on conflict prevention, rather on 
conflict transformation (ECOWAS 2012e:Art.28; cp. Ismail 2008:31). The ECPF 
is comprised of 14 components: Early Warning; Preventive Diplomacy; 
Democracy and Political Governance; Human Rights and Rule of Law; Media; 
Natural Resource Governance; Cross Border Initiatives; Security Governance; 
ECOWAS Stand by Force (ESF); Humanitarian Assistance; and Peace and 
Education (ECOWAS 2012e:Art.42). Thus, the ECPF should be seen as overall 
security architecture for relevant actions undertaken by institutions within 
ECOWAS. I would argue that the ECPF goes further than the early security 
arrangements in addressing conflicts within member states. It recognizes the need 
to address root causes of domestic conflicts and the need to foster good 
governance and democracy. In dealing with intra-state conflicts the new 
mechanism challenge the sovereignty of the individual member state that was 
guarded in the earlier phases of the RSC. Further on, the evolution of the current 
regional framework could partly be linked to on one hand the development on the 
global level of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Bellamy 2011:197) 
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and on the other hand the model of democratic-liberal peace that promotes radical 
change through regime change, new constitutions and re-organization of post-
conflict societies (MacGinty 2006:177). 
 
 
4.4.2 New Institutions 
 
The Treaty established a Secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary. In 2007 
the Secretariat was transformed into a Commission consisting of a president, a 
vice president and seven commissioners, each and every one responsible for a 
specific area. Within the body it is the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace 
and Security (PAPS) that is responsible for security related issues (ECOWAS 
2012g). Although, the capacity of the Commission is suffering from the 
restructuring from a Secretariat and lack of human resources it is acknowledged 
that the work of the first Commission has contributed to the progress of 
ECOWAS peace and security capabilities (Elowson&MacDermott 2010:20). 
The Mechanism established new institutions to improve its capacity the work 
on peace and security. These include the Mediation and Security Committee 
(MSC) under which falls three organs: The Council of Elders, the ECOWAS 
Stand-by Force (ESF) and the Defense and Security Commission (DSC). The 
MSC is a rotational system comprising nine countries elected by the Authority for 
a two-year period, with no permanent seats (ECOWAS 2012c:Art.8). The three 
sub-organs are not permanent structures, rather functions which can be called on 
when need arises. The Council of Elders consists of eminent persons from various 
segments of society that can use their good office to play role of mediators, 
facilitators and conciliators (Ismail 2008:25). The ESF, intended for PSO is made 
up of military and civilian components, to be drawn from the member states. The 
DSC is a technical advisory body, which examines the way forward for the ESF, 
including administrative issues and logistical requirements for peace-keeping. It 
consists of the Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff (advising on military issues) 
and the Committee of Chiefs of Security Service (advising on police issues) 
(ECOWAS 2012c:Art.18-22). 
The Mechanism gives the Authority power to mandate the MSC to take action 
within the mandate of the Mechanism (ECOWAS 2012c:Art.7). This makes the 
MSC the most powerful institutional body under the Mechanism (cp. Abass 
2000:215). Decisions taken by the MSC could be mediation intervention of the 
Council of Elders or by a member state leader/politician. Work within the new 
structure is done at the level of the Authority, ministers and ambassadors, which 
means that a decision in the committee is based on what the political leadership 
wants and can do (ECOWAS 2012c:Art.11-14). The ambition is to obtain 
consensus for the decisions, but the formal rules states that two thirds majority, 
six of its nine members, is needed for a decision to be taken (cp. Aning 2007:536). 
Within the Community Parliament the Defense, Security and Integration 
Committee deals with conflict prevention, primarily concerning financing and 
oversight. An ECOWAS community levy – a community tax on 0.5 percent on 
goods from third countries – generates resources for financing regional 
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integration. The levy is administered by the Parliament (ECOWAS 2012a). A 
percentage of the levy is earmarked for peace and security activities, the Peace 
Fund. The fund is however not intended to cover financing of peace-keeping 
missions. However, the Parliament has no legislative powers, and no influence on 
procurement, policymaking and implementation. The limited role of the 
Parliament on peace and security has led to increasingly antagonism between the 
Authority and the MSC (Aning 2004:539). I would argue that the predominant 
pattern of executive dominance within the ECOWAS could be explained by the 
existence of such a pattern in member states constitutions and domestic lack of 
separation of power between different bodies of the state (Aning 2004:541).  
The current evolutionary step has also resulted in further materialization of the 
RSC that could be illustrated by three features. The first feature is an emerging 
division of labour between on one hand member states and on the other hand 
between ECOWAS and the international community. The division between 
member states is aiming at harmonizing peace support operations within the RSC 
along the following lines: facilities in Côte d'Ivoire to handle tactical level training 
(temporarily relocated to Mali, Ecole pour le Maintien de la Pax, Bamako); 
facilities in Ghana (Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra) to handle 
operational training; facilities in Nigeria (National Defense College, Abuja) to 
handle strategic level training (Cilliers 2008:14). The purpose is to optimize the 
use of training infrastructure and resources, and to contribute towards 
standardization and interoperability among the security forces in the region. The 
inclusion of Francophone Côte d'Ivoire and Mali could be seen in the light of 
easing the linguistic tension that undermined previous efforts (Bah 2005:80). 
Thus, one could say that the new security architecture has successfully bridge the 
gap between Anglophone and Francophone West Africa (Melly 2008:16). 
The division of labour between ECOWAS and the international community 
should be viewed in the context of the current international security agenda where 
Africa in the latest decade has come to be regarded as highly relevant in terms of 
security policy. African regions, including West Africa, are becoming important 
oil producers and global actors are increasingly coming to view parts of the 
continent from the angle of energy security (Kliengebiel 2005:36). Military aid 
and military training programs in partnership with ECOWAS and/or individual 
member states, illustrated by the British Military Assistance Training Team 
(BMATT), the French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity Program 
(RECAMP) and the US African Contingency Operations Training Assistance 
(ACOTA), have become important mechanisms in the promotion of regional 
peace and security (Berman&Sams 2002:40). Beside these global actors the EU is 
a key donor to ECOWAS peace and security framework through the European 
Development Fund (EDF) (Elowson&MacDermott 2010:61). Recent decade has 
also seen an increase in Chinese military aid and cooperation with Africa, 
however, more linked to countries that are important suppliers of energy and raw 
materials, and not particularly West Africa where traditional links to Europe and 
the US still dominates (Shinn 2008:161). 
The second feature is the lesson drawn from the previous phase that ECOWAS 
did not have sufficient capacity to predict outbreaks of conflict, i.e. an Early 
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Warning System (EWS) leading to early response. Therefore, the organization has 
set up a structure with four zonal headquarters aiming at detecting conflicts at an 
early stage throughout the region (ECOWAS 2012e:Art.44-47). Although, the 
EWS still suffers from constraints in institutional capacity and qualitative analysis 
it is generally seen as the most comprehensive and logically integrated system for 
conflict prevention and management on the continent (Cilliers 2005:12). It has 
resulted in a number of actions, often high-level political response or shuttle 
diplomacy, illustrated by mediation in intra-state conflicts, inter alia in Guinea 
2008 to bring about an agreement between national stakeholders after the demise 
of President Conte followed by a coup d'état, in Togo 2009-2010 to secure that 
elections were properly carried out, in Niger 2009-2010 to restore dialogue 
between national stakeholders in response to the incumbent president´s attempt to 
unconstitutional maintenance of power followed by a coup d'état, in Côte d'Ivoire 
2010 when incumbent President Gbagbo refused to accept election results. 
However, the pattern of mediation has been characterized of ad hoc response 
rather than formalized interventions were former Heads of State have come to 
play an important role, rather than the Council of Elders. 
The third feature of the current development is the establishment of national 
and regional PSO capabilities illustrated on one hand by participation in UN 
and/or AU missions, inter alia in Chad, Sudan and Somalia, and on the other hand 
the formation of the ESF. The ESF has succeeded ECOMOG with the aim to 
provide the organization with relevant PSO capability in order to implement 
relevant provisions of the Treaty and the Mechanism within the EPSF, as well as 
the continental commitments linked to the APSA (ECOWAS 2012e:Art.89-92). 
Compared to the ad hoc force generating processes in the previous phase the ESF 
will be comprised of 5,000 soldiers within pre-determined units from most 
member states. The ESF has set up a Force Headquarters and planning element in 
Abuja and designated a regional logistic base, with the support of the US, in 
Sierra Leone (Cilliers 2008:13). Unlike previous domination from more powerful 
member states like Nigeria, the new framework has been more inclusive. Units 
have in recent years undergone training required for certification. However, the 
original plan to be fully operational in 2010 has been postponed and external 
observers have noted that the implementation of the framework has been weak 
and that the readiness to deploy could be questioned (Elowson&MacDermott 
2010:55). 
Most recent development is related to the situation in Mali after Islamic 
militants have taken control of the northern part of the country followed by a coup 
d'état in March 2012. Already from the start ECOWAS condemned the overthrow 
of the democratically elected government, imposed sanctions and convinced the 
military junta to step down in favour of a transitional government. The Islamic 
insurgency is seen as a threat to regional peace and security and in September 
ECOWAS turned to the UN requesting the SC to authorize a military intervention. 
The request was followed by a resolution that initiated preparations followed by a 
resolution in December authorizing the deployment of an African-led mission in 
Mali under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter with the aim to 
restore government control of its territory, and to mobilize international financial, 
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technical, and logistical resources (UN 2012b; UN 2012c). ECOWAS is planning 
to send a 3,300-strong West African force supported by France and other Western 
powers (Melly 2012). So far 13 member states have pledged to contribute troops 
with the Malian army taking the lead. Unlike previous interventions Nigeria is 
only contributing around 700 soldiers providing mainly the logistic support of the 
force (Ross 2012). It is not clear if this number of troops will be reached or when 
the force will be able to deploy. However, ECOWAS has expressed its 
determination to play its full role in the process and the will to immediately 
initiate consultations with Mali, member states, the AU, the UN, and all other 
concerned partners, towards the expeditious and full implementation of the 
resolution (ECOWAS 2012h). Although, there are many challenges related to an 
intervention in Mali I would argue that the RSC has come a long way in providing 
for its own peace and security. On this occasion the organization is acting on the 
authority of its whole community and with the blessing of the international 
community. Further on, the previous Anglophone and Francophone divide has 
been overcome and the unequal distribution of power and fear for Nigerian 
domination has been replaced by more suitable and stable agreements. 
 
 
4.4.3 Observations 
 
From the discussion in this section follows three observations linked to the third 
evolutionary step of the RSC. The first is the replacement of previous unequal 
distribution of power in the region with more suitable and stable arrangements. 
This is not to say that the role of the regional hegemon Nigeria is no longer 
important for the RSC, rather that the establishment of an inclusive authority that 
acts on behalf of the whole community has equalized the distribution of power, 
recently illustrated by its collective action in Mali. However, the RSC will 
continue to be highly dependent on the foreign policy of Nigeria. By paying two-
thirds of the ECOWAS annual budget it earns the right to have its voice heard. 
The second observation is that earlier amity and enmity has been replaced by a 
neighbourliness involving all countries in the RSC, illustrated by the division of 
labour among member states and the establishment of a regional stand-by force. 
The third observation is the parallel development of shared norms and rules of 
conduct with materialization in institutions and security mechanisms. However, 
the capabilities of the RSC continues to mirror the capacity of its member states 
that in turn indicates the need for continued external support for the 
implementation of its new security architecture. I would argue that these factors 
together have contributed to a higher degree of security interdependence within 
the RSC and a move towards a security community or a society of states that goes 
beyond the earlier phase characterized of regime security.  
38 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this concluding chapter is threefold. The first is to bring together 
the theoretical and empirical findings of the study. The second purpose is to 
identify key mechanisms that have an implication on the evolution of the West 
African Regional Security Complex (RSC) and its role as a security provider. The 
third is to take a stand on how conclusions from this study could be generalized to 
regions among the world including suggestions on further studies on regions as 
security providers. 
The point of departure for my study has been on one hand that contemporary 
threats to international peace and security are increasingly regional, arising within 
states rather than from a global or out-of-region origin and on the other hand that 
the regions among the world has become salient security providers. The 
epistemological and theoretical basis of the thesis rests on social constructivist 
concepts and theories on the evolution of RSCs. Following the traditions of the 
English School I depart from the realist position that the international system is 
anarchic and the sovereignty of states, but find it possible to establish common 
norms and rules of conduct within that system. Further on, the study reflects a 
larger and on-going debate in IR about on one hand the region as a distinct 
ontological level between the local and global levels and on the other hand the 
influence of international and regional institutions in the international system. 
Methodologically the study faces one major challenge. That is the 
consideration whether the constructivist notion of ideal-types of a Weberian state 
and a Westphalian system can be understood as universalistic or just a pure 
Eurocentric phenomenon. The challenge I found is that the Weberian state and the 
Westphalian system were never really transferred to the African continent. The 
Western ideal-type of state that is the assumption of most IR theories does simply 
not exist. This is not to say that ideal-types of states cannot be applied in my 
study, however, it indicates that it has to be done with a high degree of context 
sensitivity and reflexivity. Therefore, I have chosen to interpret the state in West 
Africa as a hybrid copy of the ideal-type of the Weberian state, meaning that it is 
a state still in the process of state-formation. 
I have found that the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation among the 
countries in West Africa are so interlinked that their security problems cannot 
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another. Thus, the region 
qualifies as a RSC that distinguishes it from neighbouring regions. In my analysis 
of the RSC I have identified three evolutionary steps that have transformed it from 
a system of states characterized of initially, conflict transformation and a pattern 
of security interdependence shaped by fear of war and rivalry, through a security 
regime shaped by fear of war and rivalry, but a regime where fears and 
expectations are restrained by an agreed set of rules of conduct, to a society of 
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states or security community where states do not expect or prepare for the use of 
force in their relations, instead they settle their disputes in other ways. 
The process of security interdependence in West Africa has been highly 
dependent on de jure alternations over time in three variables. The first is the shift 
in distribution of power or polarity; illustrated by the absolute dominance of the 
regional hegemon Nigeria in the early stages of evolution to a more equal 
distribution of power among member states in contemporary security 
arrangements, however, still dependent on Nigerian economic and military 
capacity. The second is changes in the pattern of enmity; illustrated by early 
national and elite interests of regime security and domestic security concerns, 
Anglophone and Francophone rivalry, succeeded by regional amity and shared 
concern of regional security. The third alternation is the penetration of external 
actors; illustrated by variations in the influence of global actors with historical 
and/or strategic/economic interests in the region, inter alia the UK, France and the 
US, characterized of early national interests, replaced by shared concern of 
regional security. The transformation could be identified by the increasingly 
social construction of ideational structures and the materialization in regional 
institutions and economic, social and political interaction among member states, 
illustrated by the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peace-keeping and Security (the Mechanism), The Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance (the Protocol) and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention 
Framework (ECPF) that together form the new security architecture of the RSC. 
My conclusion is that development of shared norms and concepts of conduct 
among member states in the region is a precondition for effective and well-
working regional institutions, however, the materialization of norms and values 
will decide on the actual capabilities of the RSC. 
The causal chain and causal mechanisms that cause the shift from one step to 
another step has been dependent on lessons learned and shared experiences in 
previous evolutionary step. Thus, the mechanisms behind the West African RSC 
of today and its security architecture is the result of a historical development 
dependent on the experiences from the inter-linked conflicts in the Mano River 
Basin that lay bare the weakness of early established norms and rules of conduct, 
and institutions. However, the transformation of the RSC and its role as a security 
provider has also been dependent on the foreign policy of the regional hegemon 
Nigeria and the interests of global actors. In short, my study shows that the 
interface between on one hand the local and regional levels, and one the other 
hand the regional and global levels conflate in the case of West Africa. 
I have found three re-occurring characteristics that have continued to hamper 
the evolution of the RSC and its role as a security provider. The first is that the 
capabilities of the RSC mirrors the weak state capacity of its members resulting in 
a gap between agreed norms and rules of conduct, and institutional capacity and 
resources that restrict the possibilities to implement agreed policies.  The second 
is that the principles of state sovereignty and search for consensus among member 
states has often blocked regional decision-making and collective conflict 
prevention and management. The third is the phenomenon of presidentialism and 
the prevailing pattern of executive dominance in member states and its 
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repercussions on regional decision-making that has led to unclear and conflicting 
separation of power between key organs on the regional level. Further evolution 
of the RSC, as envisaged in the new security architecture - the Mechanism, the 
Protocol and the EPSF - will therefore be dependent on a progressive 
development of its member states’ capacities and resources, democratization and 
constitutional reforms both on the domestic and regional level, as well as a need 
for continued international support. 
The result of my study confirms that the Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT) holds when analysing the West African RSC, however, not reaffirming 
that the regional level represents a distinct ontological level of analysis, rather that 
it conflates with the local and global levels in the international system through on 
one hand the existence of a regional hegemon, and on the other hand penetration 
of global actors. Methodologically results from a single case research normally 
have limited possibilities to be generalized to other cases. However, I would argue 
that these results could be generalized to other regions with similar conditions, 
primarily on the African continent, inter alia East Africa and Southern Africa, and 
secondarily to other continents on a case by case basis. This is not to say that 
experiences from West Africa and the evolution of its security architecture could 
be transferred to other regions without taking into account the regional context. 
The results, per se, would probably not be applicable to regions including global 
actors or regions with pre-dominantly consolidated democracies. Therefore, I 
suggest that further case studies or comparative studies are carried out to 
investigate primarily how progress in the contemporary West African security 
architecture could be applied to less mature RSCs and secondarily security 
dynamics and interaction between RSCs and global actors. A matter of particular 
interest would be to study the emerging Chinese penetration into the African 
continent, partly challenging traditional linkages to former colonial powers. 
Further on, as mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, my study has been 
focused on physical security linked to territoriality and not the rise of new security 
threats such as organized criminality, drug and human trafficking, illicit 
exploitation of natural resources and terrorism that would be of relevance for 
further security studies.  
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Executive Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the region in its role as a regional security 
provider through a within-case study of West Africa. The point of departure for 
the study has been on one hand that contemporary security threats are increasingly 
regional, arising within states rather than from a global or out-of-region origin 
(Buzan&Weaver 2003), and on the other hand that regions among the world have 
become increasingly salient actors in the space between the domestic and global 
levels in international relations (Buzan 1991; Bellamy 2004). The concept of 
security is to be understood as the pursuit of freedom from threat (Buzan 
1991:37). Thus, the thesis defines a security provider as an actor with ability to 
successfully reduce/remove a specific threat against a specific object. The focus of 
the study is on physical security; however, it takes into consideration societal 
security, i.e. the economic, societal and environmental sectors that relate to 
physical security through their impact on the threat and use of force.  
The scientific problem of the study is not the growing regionalization, per se, 
rather the delimitation of the region as an autonomous ontological entity from on 
one hand the state and on the other hand the global level. Some argue that it is a 
distinct level (Buzan&Waever 2003), others that the levels, in particular, the 
regional and international levels conflate (Lake&Morgan 1997). In short, what is 
at the center of the paper is whether the region is a security actor that 
ontologically could be defined as an autonomous level of analysis or if it is an 
institution through which states on the regional level as well as the global level 
have decided to act. The research question of the thesis is: What are the 
mechanisms behind the region as a security provider in the case of West Africa? 
 
 
Theoretical Approach 
 
The theoretical basis of the study rests on social constructivist concepts and 
theories on the evolution of the West African Regional Security Complex (RSC). 
Following the traditions of the English School I accept the realist position that the 
international system is anarchic and the sovereignty of states, but I find it possible 
to establish common norms and rules of conduct within that system. The 
theoretical framework departs from the Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT) developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003) and the concept of 
Security Communities (Bellamy 2004). A RSC is defined as ´a set of units whose 
major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that 
their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one 
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another` (Buzan&Waever 2003:44). Security Communities could be understood 
as communities whose members renounce the use of force in their relations with 
one another in accordance with a heightened sense of ´we-feeling` (Bellamy 
2004:14). In order to qualify as an RSC the members must possess a certain 
degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set 
and to differentiate them from the surrounding regions (Buzan&Waever 2003:47). 
My hypothesis is that the degree of security interdependence that decides on 
the evolution of the RSC is dependent on, firstly the polarity or distribution of 
power within the RSC, secondly the social construction or pattern of amity and 
enmity between the members of the RSC, and thirdly the penetration of external 
actors or ´outside` actors inside the RSC. These variables are throughout the study 
analysed in terms of ideational structures (e.g. identities, interests and norms) and 
material aspects (e.g. institutions, political/military interaction). 
 
 
Methodological Considerations 
 
A case is a well-defined aspect of a historical episode selected for analysis, 
defined as ´an instance of a class of events` that are investigated regarding the 
causes of similarities or differences among those instances (George&Bennett 
2005:17). Regions among the world that has developed into RSCs represent a 
designated and integrated social phenomenon that easily could be defined 
historically and territorially as an instance of a class of events. From this follows 
that the thesis is a case of evolution of RSCs, delimited to the African context and 
West Africa. Case study research varies from theory-building, theory-
development and theory-testing, however, my primary interest is to test and refine 
the RSCT by applying it to a particular region (cp. George&Bennett 2005:109). 
Thus, it is depth not breadth that counts in this study, and West Africa is chosen 
because it is revelatory and unusual among the approximately dozens (depending 
on how one cluster regions, sub-regions and super-regions) of RSCs (cp. 
Buzan&Weaver 2003). Compared to regions that represent more mature security 
complexes, e.g. Europe and North America, the West African region typically 
form a RSC in being, thus, suitable for theory testing and refining. The study will 
show that the West African RSC has developed an extensive security architecture 
for conflict prevention and management; however, its capacity to move from 
rhetoric to practice has been dependent on domestic conditions in member states, 
the regional hegemon Nigeria and global actors, inter alia former colonial powers, 
and the US and the UN. Thus, the choice of West Africa complies with the 
primary criterion of relevance for case selection to the research objectives of the 
study, and provides the kind of control and variation required by the research 
problem (cp. George&Bennett 2005:83). 
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Focus on West Africa 
 
The empirical part of the thesis analysis the West African RSC, firstly from the 
position of the weakness of the member states and secondly from three ideal-types 
of evolutionary steps in the process of securitisation and desecuritisation (cp. 
Buzan&Weaver 2003:53-54). The first step is the founding of the RSC, a period 
characterized of a Hobbesian anarchic system, conflict transformation and a 
pattern of security interdependence characterized by fear of war and rivalry. The 
second step is characterized of a Lockean model of security regime, ad hoc 
conflict management shaped by fear of war and rivalry, but a regime where fears 
and expectations are restrained by an agreed set of rules of conduct. The third step 
is the new security architecture characterized of a process of domestic 
democratization and liberalization, consolidation of the RSC and a move towards 
a Kantian model of security community where states do not expect or prepare for 
the use of force in their relations with each other (cp. Buzan&Weaver 2003:471). 
The method applied in my analysis is to identify the causal chain and the causal 
mechanisms through an analysis on one hand of each step, and on the other hand 
the mechanisms that causes the transformation from one step to next step (cp. 
George&Bennett 2005:206). Thus, from a methodological point of view it is 
important to view the RSC not as a static entity, rather one that evolves over time 
depending on a combination of internal and external transformation, and as a 
result of a historical process. 
 
 
Result 
 
The main findings of the study are that the evolution of the West African RSC has 
been highly dependent on de jure changes over time in three variables. The first is 
the shift in distribution of power; illustrated by the extreme dominance of the 
regional hegemon Nigeria in the earlier stages of evolution to a more equal 
distribution of power among member states in contemporary security 
arrangements, however, still dependent on Nigerian economic and military 
capacity. The second is the change in the pattern of enmity; illustrated by early 
national and elite interests of regime security and domestic concerns, Anglophone 
and Francophone rivalry, succeeded by regional amity and concerns of regional 
security. The third is the alternation in penetration of external actors; illustrated 
particularly by the influence of actors with historical and/or strategic/economic 
interests in the region, inter alia the UK and France together with the US and the 
UN. The transformation could be identified by the social construction of 
ideational structures and the materialization in regional institutions, and 
economic, social and political interaction among member states. 
In my analysis I found that the causal chain and causal mechanisms that cause 
the shift from one step to another step has been dependent on the lessons learned 
and shared experiences in previous evolutionary step. Thus, the mechanisms 
behind the West African RSC of today and its security architecture is the result of 
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a historical development, especially dependent on the experiences from the inter-
linked conflicts in the Mano River Basin that lay bare the weakness of earlier 
norms and rules of conduct, and institutions of the RSC. However, the 
transformation of the RSC and its role as a security provider has also been 
dependent on the foreign policy of the regional hegemon Nigeria and the interests 
of global actors. In short, my study shows that the interface between on one hand 
the local and regional levels, and one the other hand the regional and global levels 
conflate in the case of West Africa. 
In the study I found three re-occurring characteristics that have continued to 
hamper the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation, and the evolution of 
the West African RSC. The first is that the capabilities of the RSC mirrors the 
weak state capacity of its members resulting in a gap between agreed norms and 
rules of conduct, and institutional capacity and resources that restrict the 
possibilities to implement agreed policies.  The second is that the principles of 
state sovereignty and search for consensus among member states has often 
blocked regional decision-making and collective conflict prevention and 
management. The third is the phenomenon of presidentialism and the prevailing 
pattern of executive dominance in member states and its repercussions on regional 
decision-making that has led to unclear and conflicting separation of power 
between key organs on the regional level. Further evolution of the region as a 
security provider, as envisaged in the ECOWAS Treaty and related protocols will 
therefore be dependent on a progressive development of its member states’ 
capacity and resources, democratization and constitutional reforms both on the 
domestic and regional level. 
The result of my study confirms that the RSCT holds in the analysis of the 
West African RSC. However, not reaffirming that the regional level represents a 
distinct ontological level of analysis, rather that it conflates with the local and 
global levels in the international system through on one hand the existence of a 
regional hegemon, and on the other hand the penetration of global actors. 
Methodologically results from a single case research have limited possibilities to 
be generalised to other cases. However, I would argue that the results could be 
generalized to other regions with similar conditions, primarily on the African 
continent, inter alia East Africa and Southern Africa, and secondarily to other 
continents on a case by case basis. This is not to say that experiences from West 
Africa and the evolution of its security architecture could be transferred to other 
regions without taking into account the regional context. Results would probably 
not be applicable to regions including global actors or regions with pre-
dominantly consolidated democracies and developed states. The study finishes 
with suggestions on further studies on regions as security providers. 
  
45 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
 
Printed Publications 
 
Aning, Emmanuel, Kwesi, 2011.  Identifying and Responding to Africa´s Security 
Challenges, in Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World, United 
States Institute of Peace Press. 
Ayangafac, Chrysantus and Jakkie Cilliers, 2011. African Solutions to African 
Problems: Assessing the Capacity of African Peace and Security Architecture, 
in Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World, United States Institute 
of Peace Press. 
Bellamy, Alex, J., 2004. Security Communities and their Neighbours: Regional 
Fortresses or Global Integrators?, Palgrave Macmillan. 
______, 2011. Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, Routledge. 
Bratton, Michael and van de Walle, Nicholas, 1997. Democratic Experiments in 
Africa: Regime Transition in Comparitive Perspectives, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Buzan, Barry, 2006. From International to World Society? English School Theory 
and the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge University Press. 
______, 2009. people, states & fear: an agenda for international security studies 
in the post-cold war era, ECPR Press. 
Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever, 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Society, Cambridge University Press. 
Crocker, Chester, S.. Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela All, 2011. The Mosaic of 
Global Conflict Mangement, in Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented 
World, United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Deutsch, Karl, W., Sidney, A Burell and Robert A., Kann, 1957. Political 
Community in the North Athlantic Area, Princeton University Press. 
Duffield, Mark, 2007. Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the 
World of Peoples, Polity Press. 
Dunne Tim and Brian, C. Schmidt, 2008. Realism, in The Globalization of World 
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press. 
Elowson, Camilla and Justin MacDermott, 2010. ECOWAS Capabilities in Peace 
and Security: A scoping study of progress and challenges, Swedish Defence 
Research Agency. 
Ferguson, James, 2007. Global Shadows – Africa in the Neoliberal World Order, 
Duke University Press.  
Fukuyama, Francis, 2005, State Building: Governance and World Order in the 
Twenty-First Century, Profile Books Ltd. 
George, Alexander, L. and Andrew Bennett, 2005. Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences, MIT Press. 
46 
 
Herbst, Jeffrey, 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in 
Authority and Control, Princeton University Press. 
Hobbes, Thomas, 2006. Leviathan, Dover Publications, Inc. 
Holsti, Kalevi, J., 1998. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 
1648-1989, Cambridge University Press. 
______, 2004. The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge University Press.  
Hurrell, Andrew, 2009. On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of 
International Society, Oxford University Press. 
Hyden, Goran, 2007. African Politics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Jackson, Patrick, Thaddeus, 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International 
Relations: Philosophy of science and its implications for the study of world 
politics, Routledge. 
Jörgel, Magnus and Mats Utas, 2007. The Mano River Basin Area: Formal and 
Informal Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, Swedish 
Defence Research Agency. 
Lake, David, A., and Patrick, M., Morgan, 1997. Building Security in the New 
World of Regional Orders, University Park: Penn State university Press. 
Lindberg, I., Staffan, 2006, Democracy and Elections in Africa, Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Linklater, Andrew, 2005. The English School, in Theories of International 
Relations, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Locke, John, 2001. The Second Treatise of Government, in The Philosophy of 
Human Rights, Paragon House. 
Mac Ginty, Roger, 2006. No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace 
Processs and Peace Accords, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mamdani, Mahmood, 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton University Press. 
May, Tim, 2011. Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process, Fourth Edition, 
Open University Press. 
Murithi, Timothy, 2005. The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and 
Development, Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Nussbaum, Marta, C. 2008. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities 
Approach, Cambridge University Press. 
Patrick, Stewart, 2011. Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and 
International Security, Oxford University Press. 
Reno, William, 1998. Warlord Politics and African States, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc. 
Rotberg, Robert, I., 2003. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Sayer, Andrew, 2000. Realism and Social Science, SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Shinn, David, H., 2008, Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the 
Rest of the World, in China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, edited by 
Robert I. Rotberg, Brookings Institution Press. 
Waltz, Kenneth, N., 2001. Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, 
Colombia University Press. 
47 
 
Williams, Paul, D. and Jurgen Haacke, 2011. Regional Approaches to Conflict 
Management, in Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World, United 
States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
 
Journals and Articles 
 
Abass, Ademola, 2000. The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: 
Innovations and Problems, in Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 5, No. 
2, pp. 211-229. 
Adebajo, Adekeye, 2010. Pax Nigeriana and the Responsibility to Protect, in 
Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 2, pp. 414-435. 
Ademojubi, Said, 2004. Conflict and peace building in West Africa: the role of 
civil society and the African Union, in Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 
4, No. 1, pp. 59-77.  
Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi, 2004. Investing in Peace and Security in Africa: The 
Case of ECOWAS, in Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 
533-542. 
Bah, Alhaji, M., S., 2005. West Africa: from a security complex to a security 
community, in African Security Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 77-83. 
Barnett, Michael, N. and Martha Finnemore, 1999. The Politics, Power, and 
Pathologies of International Institutions, in International Organization, Vol. 
53, No. 4, pp. 699-732. 
Bauer, Steffen, 2006. Does Bureaucracy Really Matter? The Authority of 
Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats in Global Environmental Politics, in 
Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 23-49. 
Berman, Eric, G. and Katie E. Sams, 2002. The peacekeeping capacities of 
African regional organisations, in Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, pp. 31-55.  
Boege, Volker, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan, 2009. On Hybrid 
Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing – States in the Global 
South or Research and Politics in the West?, in The Berghof Handbook for 
Conflict Transformation, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict 
Management. 
Brante, Thomas, 2001. Consequences of Realism for Sociological Theory-
Building, in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 
167-195. 
Bratton, Michael, 2008, Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns, 
in Electoral Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 621-632. 
Carothers, Thomas, 2002, The End of the Transition Paradigm, in Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 5-21. 
Galtung, Johan, 1969. Peace, and Peace Research, in Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 167-191. 
Gberie, Lansana, 2003. ECOMOG: The Story of a Heroic Failure, in African 
Affairs, Vol. 102, pp. 147-154. 
48 
 
Klingebiel, Stephan, 2005. Africa´s New Peace and Security Architecture, in 
African Security Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 35-44. 
Lewis, Peter, M., 2003, Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime, in Journal of 
Democracy, Vol 14, No. 3, pp. 131-144. 
Lindberg, Staffan, I., 2003, ´It´s Our Time to “Chop”`: Do Elections in Africa 
Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counteract it?, in Democratization, Vol. 
10, No. 2, pp. 121-140. 
Liviga, Athumani, J., 2009, Tanzania: A Bumpy Road to Consolidated 
Democracy, in Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, 
pp. 1-42. 
March, James, G. and Johan P. Olsen, 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of 
International Political Orders, in International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 
pp. 943–969. 
Mearsheimer, John, J, 1995. The False Promise of International Institutions, in 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 5-49. 
Obi, Cyril, 2009. Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: 
Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte 
d’Ivoire, in African Security, Vol. 2, No. 2-3, pp. 119-135. 
Rotberg, Robert, 2002, The New Nature of Nations-State Failure, in The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 85-96. 
van de Walle, Nicholas, 2002, Africa´s Range of Regimes, in Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 66-80. 
 
 
Internet Sources 
 
African Union (AU), 2000. Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_0.pdf 
______, 2002. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union, 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf 
African Elections Database (AED), 2012. http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
Aryeetey, Ernest, 2001, Regional Integration in West Africa, Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Working Paper No. 170, 
(Formerly Technical Paper No. 170), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5lgsjhvj79s2.pdf?expires=1357405412&id=id
&accname=guest&checksum=60CDC6547573B697C7182364B90D62C9 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2012. The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/index.html 
Cilliers, Jakkie, 2005. Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa, 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), ISS Paper 102, 
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PAPER102.PDF 
______, 2008. The African Standby Forces: An Update on Progress, Institute for 
Security Studies (ISS), ISS Paper 160, 
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PAPER160.PDF 
49 
 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 2012a. Presentation 
of ECOWAS, www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=about_b&lang=en 
______, 2012b. Treaty of ECOWAS, 
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en 
______, 2012c, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security, 
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap101299&lang=en 
______, 2012d. Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance 
Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism For Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, 
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/en/protocoles/Protocol%20on%20good-
governance-and-democracy-rev-5EN.pdf 
______, 2012e. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), 
http://ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPF_final.pdf 
______, 2012f. ECOWAS Parliament, http://www.parl.ecowas.int/ 
______, 2012g. ECOWAS Commission, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/ 
______, 2012h. ECOWAS Statement on Mali, Press Release by Kadré Désiré 
Ouedraogo, President of the Commission, on 20th December 2012, 
http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=363&lang=en&annee=2012 
Freedom House, 2010a, Cote d´Ivore, in Freedom in the World 2010, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7
805 
______, 2010b, Nigeria, in Freedom in the World 2010, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7890 
______, 2011a. Côte d'Ivoire, in Crisis Watch Database, 3
rd
 of January 2011, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-
database.aspx?EndDate=99991231&StartDate=00010101&CountryIDs=%7bA
CB2D1F7-8CB1-432E-ABFB-76436AE72921%7d 
______, 2011b. Côte d'Ivoire, in Crisis Watch Database, 1
st
 of May 2011, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-
database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7bACB2D1F7-8CB1-432E-ABFB-
76436AE72921%7d#results 
______, 2011c. Côte d'Ivoire, in Crisis Watch Database, 1
st
  of June 2011, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-
database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7bACB2D1F7-8CB1-432E-ABFB-
76436AE72921%7d#results 
______, 2012. Freedom in the World 2012, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%
20Booklet--Final.pdf 
Ismail, Olawale, 2009. The Dynamics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace 
Building in West Africa – Between Change and Stability, Discussion Paper 41, 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, http://nai.diva-
portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:241310 
Kant, Immanuel, 1795. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm 
50 
 
LeVan, A. Carl and Patrick Ukata, 2010. Nigeria, in Countries at the Crossroads 
2010, Freedom House, http://freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/country-7890-
9.pdf 
Ohene, Elizabeth, 2012. African viewpoint: Coups, a West African disease?, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17734581 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2012. 
Global Security Risks and West Africa: Development Challenges, West African 
Studies, OECD Publishing (Edited by Philipp Heinrigs and Marie 
Trémolières), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264171848-en 
Melly, Paul, 2008. Guinea: Situation Analysis and Outlook, 
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1228_1219919131_guinea.pdf 
______, 2012. Is the world ready to take on Mali's Islamists?, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20086980 
Ross, Will, 2012. West Africa prepares to take on Mali's Islamists, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20413428 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2012. The SIPRI 
Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4 
Suifon, Takwa, Zebulon, 2004. ECOWAS’ Sub-regional Peacekeeping: Learning 
through Experience, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), 
http://www.wanep.org/wanep/attachments/article/101/tp_ecowas_subregional_
peacekeeping.pdf 
United Nations (UN), 1998. The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable 
Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, United Nations S/1998/318, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/318 
______, 2012a. Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United 
Nations Office for West Africa, United Nations S/2012/510, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/385/94/PDF/N1238594.pdf?OpenElement 
______, 2012b, Security Council Resolution 2071, S/RES/2071, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2071(2012) 
______, 2012c, Security Council Resolution 2085, S/RES/2085, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085(2012) 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2012. Human Development 
Index (HDI) – 2010 Rankings, in Human Development Report (HDR) 2012, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/ 
Williams, Paul, D., 2007. State Failure in Africa: Causes, Consequences and 
Response, in Africa South of the Sahara 2007 (Europa World Yearbook, 
Routledge 2007), http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/research/williams07.pdf 
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), 2012. http://www.wanep.org 
World Bank, 2012. http://data.worldbank.org/country 
 
